



CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC LESSONS LEARNED REPORT

February 2016



TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	3
1. INTRODUCTION	6
1.1. LESSONS LEARNED EXERCISE OBJECTIVE	6
1.2. METHODOLOGY	6
1.3. LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINS	8
2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION	9
2.1. HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT	9
2.2. LOGISTICS GAPS	11
2.3. LOGISTICS CLUSTER RESPONSE	12
3. LOGISTICS CLUSTER SET-UP	15
4. FINDINGS	16
4.1. COORDINATION	16
4.2. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (IM)	18
4.3. COMMON LOGISTICS SERVICES	20
4.4. GLOBAL LOGISTIC CLUSTER	23
5. RECOMMENDATIONS	24
5.1. COORDINATION	24
5.2. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT	25
5.3. COMMON LOGISTICS SERVICES DELIVERY	26
5.4. GLOBAL LOGISTIC CLUSTER	26
6. MATRIX - OVERVIEW OF KEY RECOMMENDATIONS	28
ANNEX 1 - PEOPLE CONSULTED	29
ANNEX 2 - DOCUMENTS CONSULTED	30
ANNEX 3 - MISSION TERMS OF REFERENCE	32
ANNEX 4 - OVERVIEW OF SURVEY RESULTS	34
ANNEX 5 - ACCRONYMS	35



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As part of the Global Logistics Cluster strategy and WFP mandatory requirements for L3 emergencies, the Global Logistics Cluster commissioned a Lessons Learned exercise in Central African Republic, in October 2015. The objective was to draw lessons learned from the Logistics Cluster operation, for the period July 2013 to 31 October 2015, assessing the relevance/appropriateness, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Logistics Cluster response. The findings will inform the future development of Logistics Cluster operations and contribute to the development of the Logistics Cluster strategy 2016-2018.

Findings show that the stakeholders' perception of the Logistics Cluster response in CAR is divided into two periods: the first period going from July 2013 to December 2014 can be characterised as a period of "weak performance", while the second period, going from January to October 2015, is characterised as "good performance". Coordination activities were appreciated throughout, however, the Logistics Cluster strategy in the initial period was

overwhelmingly found to be inappropriate, not addressing the needs of the humanitarian community to effectively and efficiently reach the beneficiaries with lifesaving relief items.

The strategy of the Logistics Cluster did not change significantly in 2015; however, participating organisations perceived the performance and strategy more positively in terms of relevance and appropriateness. The main contributing factors were leadership, staff continuity, and staff resources and skills.

When the Logistics Cluster was activated in August 2013, funding was scarce, the security situation was critical and access was extremely challenging. In addition in-country logistics infrastructure was insufficient and logistics capacity of humanitarian actors lacking. To contribute effectively to the humanitarian response, the Logistics Cluster would have needed a strong leadership to ensure an adequate set-up, in terms of resources, skills, partnerships, and global support for implementation. However, this leadership did not materialise, leading to an initial inadequate performance.

The analysis undertaken leads to the following overall recommendations:

ENSURE STRONG LEADERSHIP

Strong and proactive Leadership is essential when setting up a Logistics Cluster operation. WFP's commitment, at the highest level of the organisations, to act as the Lead Agency of the Logistics Cluster needs to come through also at the operational level. The WFP Lessons Learned exercise for CAR recommends to ensure that WFP staff assigned to lead an emergency (with overall responsibility for the Logistics Cluster mandate) has the required qualifications including a full understanding of the importance of a proactive leadership role in the cluster system and the responsibilities of WFP as designated Lead agency.

Recommended Action: Ensure WFP Proactive Cluster Leadership at all levels

It is recommended for the Global Logistics Cluster to support this by raising awareness on the cluster mandate, responsibilities and requirements and to develop a strategy drawing on other agencies interest and capacity to manage and implement Logistics Cluster activities.

ENSURE GLOBAL SUPPORT

It is recommended to develop a mechanism to activate increased support from the Global Logistics Cluster in situations where the local Logistics Cluster operation cannot adequately address the gaps on the ground due to lack of funds, resources, staff, knowledge, or specific local challenges.

Recommended Action: Ensure continued and aligned Global Support

In terms of immediate emergency funds, it is recommended to review and possibly improve the "no regrets" policy. It is also recommended to ensure that Country Offices are aware of the benefits of deploying trained and specialized staff to fully benefit from the Logistics Cluster and the support that can be received in accordance with the cluster mandate.

BUILD HUMAN RESOURCES

Staff continuity, skillset and support resources made a significant difference in the performance of the Logistics Cluster in CAR.

Recommended Action: Invest in Staff

It is recommended to invest in training of Logistics Cluster staff and in supporting country office structures as well as reviewing the mechanisms of staff recruitment and retention to minimise staff turnover.

DEVELOP COMMON SERVICES STRATEGY

The Logistics Cluster strategy in CAR depended largely on WFP common service delivery as few – if any – other actors had adequate logistics resources available, however, WFP resources and commitment were also limited, hence the overall services available to the humanitarian community were inadequate to satisfy the requirements of the organisations. If logistics services are identified as

a gap in an operation, it is recommended for the Logistics Cluster to develop a strategy to address the gap, taking into account other local resources and advocating for sufficient investment and resources to support the service.

Recommended Action: Common Services Strategy Development

The Logistics Cluster should facilitate access to relevant and effective services, irrespective of the service provider and should, as possible, advocate and support initiatives coming from different actors that enable relevant, effective, efficient and feasible services. The support could be related to planning, risk assessment, analysis and fundraising.



1. INTRODUCTION

As part of the Global Logistics Cluster (GLC) strategy to ensure the Cluster's accountability to all stakeholders, and as a WFP mandatory requirement for L3 emergencies, the GLC commissioned a Lessons Learned Exercise (LLE) for the Logistics Cluster operation in the Central African Republic (CAR).¹ The period covered is July 2013 - 31 October 2015.

The Logistics Cluster was activated in the Central African Republic in August 2013, a few months prior to the humanitarian crisis being declared a Level 3 emergency and a system-wide response being activated.

The Logistics Cluster operation in CAR provides a good example of a response in a country with a protracted conflict, significant humanitarian needs, limited resources available, and limited basic logistics infrastructure.

The LLE focuses on the Logistics Cluster function as a coordination mechanism as designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).² The report therefore includes a review of cluster coordination, information management, and the cluster role in facilitating access to common logistics services for the humanitarian community.

1.1. LESSONS LEARNED EXERCISE OBJECTIVE

The overall objectives of the Lessons Learned Exercise on the Logistics Cluster operation in CAR were:

- 1) To draw lessons and recommendations from the Logistics Cluster operation and support improved performance in future operations.
- 2) To support the Global Logistics Cluster in identifying best practices across operations.
- 3) To assess the performance of the Logistics Cluster in CAR particular the relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness of the activities and the capacity to identify gaps and addressing the needs of the humanitarian community.

1.2. METHODOLOGY

The standard methodology for conducting Lessons Learned exercises was developed in 2014. This methodology was applied to the CAR LLE. Quantitative and qualitative research methods were used to better understand the operation and the main issues that influenced it. Hence the findings are based on the analysis of quantitative data on the operation, crossed with qualitative data collected from stakeholders, namely their perception of the Logistics Cluster performance.

The data was collected through:

- a) **A desk review** of key documents and Logistics Cluster staff feedback (see Annex 2 for an overview of documents consulted).

¹ The CAR operation was chosen for a LLE due to the scale of the emergency (L3) as well as it is part of WFP corporate emergency response policy to conduct LLEs for all L3 emergencies when deactivated.

²<https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc-transformative-agenda/documents-public/reference-module-cluster-coordination-country-level>

- b) **Interview with 30 key stakeholders:** face-to-face interviews in Bangui, CAR from 28 October to 3 November 2015, and telephone interviews with key actors outside CAR. The interviewees were key users of the Logistics Cluster services (UN agencies and NGOs), donors, NGOs responsible for elements of the Logistics Cluster response, key representatives of the humanitarian community in CAR (OCHA, CCO, ICC), Logistics Cluster staff and WFP staff (see Annex 1 for an overview of people and organisations consulted).
- c) **User Surveys:** Information from two surveys sent to users of the Logistics Cluster services in CAR. The first survey was sent to actors present in CAR in the early phases of the response, the second survey was sent to actors currently participating in Logistics Cluster meetings in the country (see Annex 4 for an overview of survey results).³

The data collected was used to assess the performance of the operation in terms of:

- **Relevance/appropriateness** in responding to the identified and prioritised needs and how well it was adapted to the local requirements;
- **Efficiency:** how economically the Logistics Cluster inputs and resources were converted into results;
- **Effectiveness:** whether the objectives of the operation were achieved in a timely manner.

The LLE team was composed of three key members:

- 1) Alexis Ottenwaelter, Team leader, Logistics Officer/ ACF Seconded to GLC, Rome
- 2) Hubertus Jurgenliemk, Team member, Information Management Officer, GLC, Rome
- 3) Dorte Friis, Team member, Logistics Officer, GLC, Rome

Quality Assurance and Feedback from Logistics Cluster Participating Organisations

To ensure the validity of findings, the following Quality Assurance measures have been implemented:

- a) Presentation of key findings to WFP Country Office and Logistics Cluster key staff during and at the end of the field mission;
- b) Presentation of key findings to GLC, Rome including a “reality check” on the recommendations;
- c) Draft report review and feedback provided by Rie Ishii, Logistics Officer, WFP, Rome and Tom Olsen, Emergency Response and Supply Specialist, UNICEF;
- d) Feedback on draft report from GLC, the Logistics Cluster and WFP in CAR.

³ The two surveys were sent to a) people who were in CAR early in the response (49 people from 40 organisations). 13 responded giving a response rate of 27 percent. According to OCHA, 47 organisations were operating in CAR prior to the L3 activation and 85 percent of those were consulted, b) through the Logistics Cluster current mailing list to current cluster partners (69 people from 61 organisations). 19 people responded, giving a response rate of 28 percent. According to OCHA, 110 organisations are currently operating in CAR and 56 percent of those were consulted.

- e) Preliminary findings were presented at the Global Logistics Cluster meeting in Budapest in November 2015 for discussion.⁴

1.3. LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINS

The LLE provides an assessment of the performance based on the information gathered from the interviews combined with the desk review and with qualitative and quantitative data on the operation.

As the exercise was performed in October/November 2015, stakeholders from the initial phase of the operation were identified and successively consulted through a survey and, when still present, through interviews in Bangui (the team was unable to travel outside of Bangui due to security issues). However, the time lapse from the start of the operation may have affected the weight given by survey respondents and stakeholders interviewed to issues having occurred in the initial phase, thereby giving more attention to the current phase.



⁴ Comments from the Budapest Global Logistics Cluster meeting can be found in the minutes from the meeting: <http://www.logcluster.org/global-meeting-document/logistics-cluster-global-meeting-budapest-note-record-nfr>


2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

2.1. HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT

The Central African Republic has suffered from repeated armed conflicts over the past decades; this, combined with localised natural disasters, has turned the country into a state of chronic vulnerability. The country ranks 187 out of 188 on the UNDP Human Development Index; more than 77 percent of its population of 4.7 million lives on less than USD 2 a day, and nearly half the population faces extreme multidimensional poverty.⁵

In December 2012, the humanitarian situation further deteriorated when a coalition of rebels called Seleka staged an offensive against the government and eventually seized power in March 2013. Prior to the coup d'état, an estimated 664,520 people were in need of humanitarian assistance; by December 2012 OCHA estimated that the number of affected people in need of some sort of humanitarian assistance had increased to approximately 1.5 million people.⁶

Figure 1 - Timeline for main Logistics Cluster events in CAR from 2013 - end of 2015



⁵ <http://report.hdr.undp.org/>

⁶ Common Humanitarian Fund, Annual Report 2012, OCHA.

In 2013, the humanitarian situation worsened dramatically due to sectarian fighting between Seleka groups and the anti-Balaka militia.⁷ In August 2013, the Emergency Response Coordinator, Valerie Amos acknowledged that the crisis in CAR was transforming from “a long-term crisis of poverty and chronic vulnerability to a complex emergency characterised by violence, acute needs and grave protection issues” entailing a serious risk of destabilising other countries in the region.⁸ The humanitarian community faced severe security and access issues; as such, a restricted number of staff was allowed in country, further affecting the response capacity.⁹ In addition, donors’ commitment to the CAR crisis was assessed as “inadequate” compared to the scale of the humanitarian needs.¹⁰ By end of December 2013, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance was estimated at 2.5 million, including more than 900,000 Internally Displaced People (IDPs).¹¹ The IASC declared the situation in CAR a Level 3 emergency on 11 December 2013.

In the first half of 2014, violence and killings of civilians resulted in significant population movements (counting at its peak 930,000 IDPs and 446,000 refugees in neighbouring countries). This trend reduced in the second half of 2014, and by the end of the year the estimated number of people in need of humanitarian assistance had reduced to approximately 2 million people.

Table 1 - Overview of humanitarian requirements in CAR and funding obtained

Country Strategic Plan	2012	2013	2014	2015
Funding requirements USD (revised)	124 million	195 million	555 million	613 million
Funding obtained USD	77 million	103 million	379 million	320 million
Percentage funded	62%	53%	68%	52%
Logistic Cluster requirements USD (all projects under the Logistics Cluster)*	7 million**	13 million	10 million	19 million
Logistic Cluster funding obtained USD (all projects under the Logistic Cluster)	6 million**	9 million	8 million	16 million

⁷ Anti-balaka are Christian militias formed in CAR in response to the Seleka rebels activities.

⁸ Security Council Briefing on CAR by Under-Secretary General and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos, 14 August 2013.

⁹ Common Humanitarian Fund, Annual Report 2013, OCHA. For more information on security set up/peacekeeping in country, see <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusca/background.shtml>

¹⁰ Common Humanitarian Annual Report 2012 and 2013, OCHA

¹¹ Common Humanitarian Annual Report 2013 and 2014, OCHA

Percentage funded	85%	68%	74%	83%
Logistics requirements as percentage of total	6%	7%	2%	3%
Logistics funding obtained as percentage of total	8%	9%	2%	5%

*Funding requirements or allocated funding for specific Logistics Cluster activities are not specified separately. They are mixed with requirements for WFP Logistics augmentation. In addition, the main portion (up to 88%) of the logistics requirements and funding allocated under the Logistics Cluster umbrella are for UNHAS.

**Logistics Cluster requirements and funding in 2012 are entirely for UNHAS.

Table 1 shows the funding requirement levels for the CAR humanitarian assistance from 2012 to 2015 and the equivalent logistics requirements defined as projects gathered under the Logistics Cluster. As mentioned above, funding for activities in CAR was not easily obtainable. In 2013, only 30 percent of the funding requirements had been reached during the first 6 months of the year.¹² At the same time, common Logistics projects in CAR consisted mainly of UNHAS passenger and cargo transport by air (ranging from 80 to 100 percent of funding requirements), which also received the main part of the funding from 2012 to 2015 (2012 and 2013: 100 percent, 2014: 76 percent, 2015: 87 percent).¹³ Overall, while the humanitarian requirements increased substantially yearly from 2012 onwards, the logistics requirements as a percentage of total requirements decreased in 2014 and 2015.

In 2015, the security situation improved, particularly in Bangui and in the west of the country, allowing the return of part of the displaced population; however, the situation remains overall extremely volatile in both urban and rural settings. At the end of September 2015, the security situation suddenly deteriorated in Bangui. Looting, fighting and roadblocks erected in the city, impeded the ability of the humanitarian community to gain access to thousands of internally displaced people and assess needs, hence worsening an already dire humanitarian situation.

2.2. LOGISTICS GAPS

Reaching the population in CAR with assistance is complex even without the added constraints of a volatile security situation. A World Bank study in 2011 noted that CAR road network coverage poses a critical challenge due to:¹⁴

- a) **Low road density:** CAR's road density is just one-third of the density of other low-income, fragile countries;
- b) **Poor condition of the road network:** only 62 percent of the classified paved road network is in good or fair condition, compared to 80 percent in fragile states; and only 2 percent of unpaved roads is in good or fair condition;

¹² OCHA, CAR Consolidated Appeal Mid-Year Review 2013 <https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emergencyCountryDetails&cc=caf&yr=2013>

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ The Central African Republic's Infrastructure: A Continental Perspective, Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic, World Bank, 2011.

- c) **Little investment in strategic transit corridors from neighbouring countries:** mainly Cameroon and DRC;
- d) **Little public investment:** with the exception of primary roads.

In addition, the country's truck fleet consists mainly of poorly maintained second-hand trucks, due to the country transport sector's regulatory framework, which limits the use of trucks in terms of mileage and therefore limits incentives to invest in vehicles.¹⁵

Furthermore, the rainy season (June to December) severely affects transport on the corridor to Cameroon, as well as to the prefectures of Ndele, Zemio, Obo, and Rafai, and makes entire prefectures not accessible at all (Birao, Tiringoulou).¹⁶

From December 2012 to October 2015, the logistics gaps faced by the humanitarian community considerably evolved. The main gaps identified by the actors involved in the response were:

- a) **Secure access** to the affected population, which was a challenge even prior to December 2012 but deteriorated in 2013 and 2014 due to escalation in violence and increased sectarian fighting.
- b) **Physical access** extremely limited existing logistics infrastructure, coupled with damaged or destroyed road, as well as blockages and impassable roads during the rainy season.
- c) **Transport capacity** which decreased significantly after December 2013 following the repeated anti-Balaka attacks on Muslims, as a result of which many transport company operators, mainly Muslims, fled the country.
- d) **Coordination and Information Management:** At the time of the L3 activation, there were 47 registered humanitarian organisations in CAR. The humanitarian presence had decreased after the December 2012 attacks. Following the L3 activation, there was an influx of organisations in CAR; by March 2014 the registered organisations were 88, and by August they increased to 100. Currently, 110 organisations are registered.¹⁷ The high influx of new actors combined with the extremely complex operating conditions and the logistics constrains in CAR, resulting in a significant need for coordination and information sharing of logistics requirements, challenges and available resources to facilitate an effective and efficient response that encouraged collaboration and minimised duplication of efforts.
- e) **Customs facilitation:** as custom procedures changed repeatedly there was a need to obtain information and support on customs clearance.
- f) **Common storage:** In 2014, due to high insecurity, looting of warehouses and sites of several humanitarian organisations, the high influx of new actors and the sharp increase in humanitarian needs (in particular in terms of shelter and sanitation), organizations identified a strong need to facilitate more cost-effective, safer and higher quality storage.

2.3. LOGISTICS CLUSTER RESPONSE

To meet the abovementioned logistics gaps and support the humanitarian community in the efforts to deliver life-saving relief items in CAR, the Logistics Cluster was activated in August 2013, primarily to provide Coordination and Information Management (IM).

¹⁵ Ibid, p.10 According to the study, average monthly mileage in CAR is 2,000 km compared to 12,000 km in developed countries.

¹⁶ LCA - <http://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/Central+African+Republic>

¹⁷ OCHA, Operational presence (3W), <http://www.unocha.org/car>

Operation size:

The Logistics Cluster operation initially relied on the efforts of one Logistics Cluster Coordinator, one Relief Item Tracking Assistant, and on the remote IM support from GLC in Rome. In 2014, the operation was expanded to include one Information Management Officer, and additional resources for relief tracking and administrative assistance to the Logistics Cluster. The first IM Officer arrived in March 2014 and remained until December 2014. Then, a gap followed until November 2015.

In terms of resources for provision of services, the first operational budget (from July 2013) accounted for the provision of transport services at no cost for the humanitarian community for a period of two months, security and funding allowing. The provision of this service was contingent upon an expected augmentation of WFP's fleet, which was significantly delayed. A provision for the purchase of two Mobile Storage Units to augment common storage capacity was also included. The WFP Logistics augmentation component of the budget also included the rehabilitation of four bridges. In 2014, this activity was reported under the Logistics Cluster umbrella, and support provisions from a WFP engineer was added.¹⁸

However, funding was scarce for CAR activities in general, and activities under the Logistics Cluster component were to a high degree dependent on multilateral contributions received by WFP, which were then allocated by WFP to the Logistics Cluster activities in CAR.¹⁹ As shown in Table 1, the estimated logistics requirements were low and decreased as a percentage of the common humanitarian budget over the period under review.

Coordination:

From August 2013, a Coordination cell was established in Bangui with the objective of contributing to an optimised use of logistics resources, minimising duplication of logistics set-ups for the humanitarian response in CAR and consolidating requests for funding of the humanitarian operations.

Information Management:

Also from August 2013, the Logistics Cluster started facilitating information sharing among the Logistics Cluster participants to minimise duplication of efforts and to provide relevant operational information (access information, road, customs, maps and other relevant information) as required. A Logistics Cluster dedicated webpage already existed.

Logistics Services:

¹⁸ WFP budgets, narratives and financial tracking for Special Operation 200605 "Logistics Support to WFP operations, and Logistics & Emergency Telecommunications Cluster Augmentation in Central African Republic".

¹⁹ A multilateral contribution for WFP is "a contribution, for which WFP determines the country programme or WFP activities in which the contribution will be used and how it will be used, or a contribution made in response to a broad-based appeal for which WFP determines, within the scope of the broad-based appeal, the country programme or WFP activities in which the contribution will be used and how it will be used, and for which the donor will accept reports submitted to the Board as sufficient to meet the requirements of the donor". (Source WFP Financial regulations, definitions).

Until March 2014, no logistics services were provided. In March 2014, a change in the transport market following the sectarian fighting was noted in the Concept of Operations. In-country transport capacity had decreased and there was a risk of increasing competition over the scarce resources. In addition, the Concept of Operations noted a need for provision of common storage in Bangui and later (from July 2014) in field locations. However, no implementation plan was included.



3. LOGISTICS CLUSTER SET-UP

The cluster approach was initially adopted in CAR in August 2007 and some clusters had remained active throughout (for example the Nutrition Cluster), whereas others have been activated and deactivated according to new requirements.

The humanitarian crisis in CAR was declared a Level 3 emergency in December 2013. A system-wide response was then activated.

The Logistics Cluster was activated in CAR in August 2013, eight months after the Seleka coalition had started approaching Bangui and five months after they took over the government in March 2013, but four months prior to the L3 declaration in December 2013.

When the Logistics Cluster was activated there was already an active coordination system in place with different structures – such as the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and other clusters, In addition a NGO coordination forum (CCO) was subsequently established. In CAR, there is also a tradition for co-led clusters – in several clusters the lead role is shared by the mandated UN agency and an elected NGO.²⁰

Despite the numerous coordination structures present in the country, their capacity, in particular in terms of reach outside of the capital, is in general considered as fairly weak, due mainly to:²¹

- a) Insecurity and lack of access, which make activities outside of the capital difficult;
- b) High turnover of international staff in organisations;
- c) Lack of experienced professional staff (CAR is not an attractive duty station).

When the Logistics Cluster was activated, the envisaged timeframe for the operation was 3 to 4 months, after which the operation was to be reassessed.²²

The initial Concept of Operations (ConOps) indicated as Logistics Cluster main functions coordination and information management; however, facilitating access to common services, possibly through WFP-assets and on a cost-recovery method, was also envisaged.

Currently, the Logistics Cluster is expecting to continue providing coordination and information management throughout 2016, and to facilitate access to common services through various humanitarian organisations when available and relevant.

²⁰ NGO Perspectives on Humanitarian Response in Level 3 Crises, International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), IMPACT, Jan. 2015

²¹ Lessons Learned in the Central African Republic Food Security Cluster, Synthesis Report 2014; Common Humanitarian Fund, 2012 Annual Report; NGO Perspectives on Humanitarian Response in Level 3 Crises, International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), IMPACT, January 2015.

²² The first Concept of Operation (ConOPS) was published on the 20 August 2013 with a duration until end of December 2013. In December 2013, a second ConOPS was published extending the same services until end of March 2014. In March 2014, the operation was further extended till end of September 2014 and expanded to include organisation of convoys as well as provision of common storage. In July 2014, provision of common storage in the prefectures was added as well as the tracking of relief items (RITA).

4. FINDINGS

The humanitarian situation in CAR has been and still is extremely complex and challenging in particular due to the continued insecurity and lack of access to the affected population.

The difficult humanitarian situation in- the country and the severe logistics challenges, together with inadequate resources available for the response (funds and qualified senior staff) increased the requirements on the Logistics Cluster to lead organisations towards efficient partnership to maximise individual strengths.

Based on the feedback from the surveys and interviews with key stakeholders, the performance of the Logistics Cluster in CAR can crudely be divided into two periods period August 2013 – December 2014 is characterised as ‘weak performance’, while the period January– October 2015 can be characterised as “good performance”.


The performance of the Logistics Cluster is here following analysed according to Logistics Cluster key functions.

4.1. COORDINATION

Coordination is one of the pillars of the Logistics Cluster and it is intended to facilitate a unified humanitarian response, minimising the duplication of logistics activities. The Logistics Cluster identify gaps that hinder an effective response and facilitates relevant and appropriate solutions to address those gaps, which can range from information sharing to facilitation of common logistics services.

Since August 2013, the Logistics Cluster has organised 52 coordination meetings in Bangui (6 in 2013, 24 in 2014, and 23 until the end of October 2015) with an average of 14 organisations participating to each meeting (Figure 2 illustrates meeting attendance). In addition, the Logistics Cluster Coordinator attended weekly OCHA-organised civil/military coordination meetings and, when invited, the inter-NGO coordination meetings (CCO). As shown in Figure 2, the number of organisations attending the Logistics Cluster meetings increased since March 2015. 2014 had the lowest average number of organisations attending, despite having the highest number of organisations active in CAR following the L3 activation.

Figure 2 - Number of participating organisations per Logistics Cluster meeting



The Logistics Cluster meetings were co-facilitated by Handicap International, to foster NGO inclusion as well as to ensure continuity of the meetings, when the Cluster Coordinator was absent.

Non or limited appropriateness of the Logistics Cluster strategy to address gaps

The surveys questioned whether the Logistics Cluster strategy was appropriate to respond to the identified logistics gaps. 62 percent of respondents stated that the strategy was NOT appropriate in the initial period. This percentage that decreases to 21 percent when the current Logistics Cluster participants were interviewed.

The overarching gaps mentioned by the respondents and key stakeholders in both periods are related to transport and to the availability of safe and quality storage. The transport gap initially derived from a security requirement - facilitation of safe transport, for example through convoys - it subsequently changed into a lack of transport capacity combined with the need for secure transport (from December 2013), to further develop into a need for safe transport and road rehabilitation in the current period.

For storage, after the attacks in December 2013, respondents pointed out that secure storage facilities were either not available or too expensive for their small volumes, posing a real challenge to many of them.

Overall, organisations expressed that the Logistics Cluster Concept of Operation, which had not been updated since August 2014, did not adequately responded to these challenges. This will be further elaborated in the section on common services.

Challenging context increasing requirements for strong Leadership

Humanitarian operations in CAR are overall affected by the lack of adequate human resources mainly due to the unattractiveness of CAR as a duty station, leading to a high turnover of staff, and lack of experienced professionals. In addition, coordination in CAR is affected by an atmosphere of lack of trust between organisations, and in particular between UN and NGOs. According to many of the survey's respondents, the NGOs will only work with the UN as 'a last resort', when no other options are available. Nevertheless, the Logistics Cluster was expected to exercise leadership and raise the logistics challenges at the highest level in order to facilitate access to the beneficiaries.

This particular environment increased the need for the Logistics Cluster to provide competent staff, support, leadership, and ensure continuity in the operation. If this leadership role is not adequately filled, there is a high risk of ineffectiveness and inefficiency in the operation, as well as reputational risk for WFP as the lead agency and for the Logistics Cluster as an effective and inclusive instrument to increase predictability and accountability in humanitarian crises.

While the Logistics Cluster coordination efforts were appreciated to some degree, they were seen as coming too late and adding too little extra value and limited leadership. Among the reasons for the dissatisfaction among Logistics Cluster participants, the most important points raised were: the limited capacity of the lead agency (WFP) to provide sufficient support for the operation (WFP was often not represented in the Logistics Cluster meetings); the high turnover

of Logistics Cluster staff; the limited available funding; and the limited support of the Global Logistics Cluster to the operation.

Overall, in the initial period when coordination mechanisms were established, a lack of leadership, of commonly recognised gaps and the absence of a unified response - including access to common service - did not lead to minimise duplication of logistics activities in CAR. Therewith, the Logistics Cluster was not able to contribute to an effective and efficient response to the crisis.

In 2015, a higher level of continuity, commitment and available staff resources led to a more positive perception of the Logistics Cluster operation.

Table 2 - Overview of key coordination results

Function	Description	Results: August 2013 – October 2015
Coordination	Coordination through Logistics Cluster meetings and <i>ad hoc</i> bilateral meetings in Bangui: (Local authorities, OCHA, CIV/MIL, HCT, CCO (Specific INGO forum), ACTED.	Support obtained for the Logistics Cluster through partnerships: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information of services available – UNHAS, PU-AMI • Information on customs procedures • Ad hoc information on MINUSCA convoys • Ad hoc information on fuel issues, truck maintenance • Ad hoc access to warehouse training provided by WFP

4.2. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (IM)


The objective of the Logistics Cluster information management function is to contribute to an efficient and effective response through the promotion and facilitation of sharing logistics information among the organisations involved relevant to the response. Given the lack of trust among organisations in CAR, and the scarce resources available (transport, storage and product supplies), the creation of a cooperating environment where information can be shared is paramount for an effective response and to foster collaboration among organisations.

Relevant and appreciated Information Management, but opportunity for further strengthening promotion and facilitation of information sharing, encouraging collaboration and increasing visibility

In CAR, the information management (IM) function was found to be both relevant and highly appreciated. The stakeholders felt informed through the emails received and in particular in 2015, a more direct relationship was established between the Cluster Coordinator and participating organisations which induced information exchange.

The webpage was considered to be fairly up to date and useful; however, many did not consult it, as there was limited additional information compared to what was already shared during meetings. From July 2013 up till 8 November 2015, the webpage had been visited 7,897 times by a total of 3,057 unique visitors. Combined they produced 14,203 page visits. Figure 3 shows the number of uploads to the webpage per month (IM products and other news uploaded).

Figure 3 - Number of uploads to the CAR webpage October 13 to November 9 2015



An average of seven documents were uploaded to the webpage on a monthly basis. The spike in January 2014 is due to upload of 15 prefecture maps, and the one in July 2014 it is due to daily uploads of UNHAS schedules. The information uploaded to the webpage did not significantly affect the visits to the webpage. Until December 2013, there were few visits on the webpage. The activity spiked after the L3 activation in December 2013 and throughout January 2014. There was another peak in January/February 2015, otherwise visits continue on a regular pace.

When compared to another protracted emergency, namely the Democratic republic of Congo (DRC), the webpage registered a similar number of visits during the period July 2013 to December 2015. The DRC webpage was visited 3,444 times by a total of 2,742 unique visitors. Combined they produced 6,801 page visits.

The respondents and interviewees highlighted the need to strengthen the IM function in three main areas:

- 1) **Specific information** – Additional and regular information from the field (for example through NGOs present in field locations); update of the LCA; customs information; and infographics and illustrations of operational overviews. Furthermore, regular customised situation reports to OCHA and the HCT.
- 2) **Maps** – in particular access constraints maps with GPS coordinates and road conditions.
- 3) **Advocacy** – information briefs on specific logistics challenges, which would be used to raise awareness of these challenges and bottlenecks at higher levels.

Most of these IM products are part of the standard Logistics Cluster IM portfolio for cluster operations. Situation Updates, Operation Overview, Snapshots, logistics assessments, social media and communication pieces are used to

highlight activities, achievements, logistics constraints and bottlenecks. They are also used to raise awareness and visibility of an emergency among the public and to donors, which is particularly important in a protracted emergency that progressively loses the high profile on the media and among the general public. Logistics Cluster operations usually have a dedicated mailing list, to which anyone interested in the emergency can sign up through the website. The mailing list works as an accountability measure for the Logistics Cluster operation - all data is saved - and at the same time facilitates transparency, information sharing and visibility of the emergency to a larger audience as anyone can subscribe.

In CAR, for most of the period under review, the Logistics Cluster Coordinator also had to take on the IM tasks. The IM Officer position was budgeted only from 2014 onwards and filled locally from March 2014 to December 2014 and again from November 2015. Therefore, there was limited capacity to collect, analyse and disseminate timely, reliable and consistent logistics information. Because of the general distrust among organisations operating in CAR, and the competition over the scarce logistics resources available (transport, storage), collecting and disseminating information was a key task and according to the survey and interviews results, there seem to have been potential to invest further in information sharing and collaboration in CAR.

Table 3 - Overview of IM Outputs from July 2013 to October 2015

Outputs	Number
Meetings	52
Average meeting attendance per meeting – people	18
Average meeting attendance per meeting – organisations	15
IM products	4 ConOps plus 1 SOP 28 Maps 52 Meeting Minutes 3 Operation Overview 1 Snapshot 1 LCA 65 UNHAS flight schedule

4.3. COMMON LOGISTICS SERVICES DELIVERY

The Logistics Cluster facilitates access to common services where there is no other viable option available to address the identified logistics gaps, or where the combined humanitarian response can be optimised through effective and efficient service delivery. Where there are critical logistics gaps in a humanitarian response, WFP, as the lead agency of the Logistics Cluster, acts as a “provider of last resort” by offering common logistics services. This is where necessary, and where access, security, and funding makes it possible.²³

²³ IASC: <http://interagencystandingcommittee.org/other/documents-public/operational-guidance-provider-last-resort>

In CAR, the key gaps identified throughout the period were related to transport and secure storage. The Logistics Cluster facilitated very limited common services during the period under revision. The services facilitated were limited to *ad hoc* information on opportunities for using WFP transport on a cost-recovery basis, and regular information on the ECHO-funded, PU-AMI-managed common storage facility in Bangui for NGOs implementing ECHO funded projects. Additionally, two MSUs were made available through WFP to organisations in the field to facilitate common storage. In 2015, the Logistics Cluster supported and facilitated a project on roads and bridges rehabilitation implemented by the NGO ACTED to improve access to specific locations in the country. In the following paragraphs, these services are assessed in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency in addressing the gaps and contributing to the humanitarian response in CAR.

Road transport

During the period reviewed there was a continued request for support with road transport; however, requirements were not always clear. The Logistics Cluster did not facilitate free transport services, but in periods the cluster did provide information on options for using WFP transport under a bilateral cost-recovery agreement.

Nevertheless, WFP transport capacity was limited and had to be stretched in order to provide services to the requesting humanitarian actors – WFP was overwhelmed with the requirements of its own in-country response and experienced difficulties in defining support to the requests it received, requests which were often found to be unclear. On the other hand, organisations requesting WFP for transport perceived the service to be non-existent, unclear in terms of agreement or leading to long delays.

In addition, the establishment of road transport as a clear logistics gap was disputed. Up till the end of 2014, when the anti-Balaka forces drove out many Muslim transport operators, there were mixed opinions of whether transport support was an actual need, or rather a convenience.

Until the end of 2014, due to the risk of attacks on trucks and the consequent difficulty in identifying transporters willing to transport, support to transport was mainly related to the facilitation of safe transport. The need to facilitate convoys together with the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in CAR (MINUSCA)²⁴ was raised in coordination meetings, but the main parties were unclear on roles and responsibilities and the Logistics Cluster did not contribute significantly to convoy facilitation.

Overall, feedback received from the humanitarian actors highlight a transport support gap throughout the period, the lack of which resulted in continued competition among actors, delays and higher costs. WFP was the largest operator in CAR in terms of transport capacity, and it was clear that no other organisation in CAR had the capacity to take on the transport provision role. The Logistics Cluster budget could have been revised to include staffing and resources for common transport, also given the already stretched WFP staffing situation, and additional advocacy could have been done with donors to raise funds.

²⁴ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusca/>

Common Storage

The need for storage in Bangui and occasionally in the field was repeatedly identified as an issue in coordination meetings, and in the feedback received from stakeholders in the surveys. The problem was mainly linked to the lack of secure and quality storage. The cost of security, when at all available, was reported to be unaffordable for most organisations with *ad hoc* small storage requirements. In addition, staff capacity on warehouse management was deemed inadequate and identified as an area where support was needed.

At the beginning of 2014, the Logistics Cluster announced that it was looking into possibilities for setting up common storage facilities within the Bangui logistics hub WFP was planning to setup. However, this plan was never operationalised.

In parallel, the NGO Première Urgence – Aide Médicale Internationale (PU-AMI) was preparing a common storage project to be funded by ECHO and the Logistics Cluster was actively involved in the fund application.

While the 3,000 m² PU-AMI storage facility addressed some of the identified needs, use was limited to NGOs. ECHO requested PU-AMI to provide regular updates on the storage available during the Logistics Cluster coordination meetings to ensure participants has access to the facility and to promote coordination and information sharing among users.

The Logistics Cluster announced that it would help expand the storage capacity of the facility through provision of additional storage units, which were included in the Logistics Cluster budget. However the augmentation of the overall storage capacity did not materialise.

The Logistics Cluster facilitated the installation of two mobile storage units (MSU) in the field to augment storage capacity. Participating organisations sent requests to the Logistics Cluster for the provision of MSUs in a number of locations, Kabo and Batangafo were selected. IOM received and managed a MSU in Kabo, and the Danish Refugee Council the second one in Batangafo. The MSUs were open to all humanitarian actors to use and the stock information was tracked through the Relief Item Tracking Application (RITA) (see Table 4 for an overview on field common storage).

Table 4 - Overview of common storage provided in the field

Function	Description	Results: August 2013 – October 2015
Common Storage Batangafo	Provision of common storage in Batangafo – MSU provided by the Logistics Cluster, and managed by DRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 organisations used the facility (DRC and WFP) • A total of 184 mt or 408 m3 were stored • WFP was the main user storing 79% in terms of weight or 65% in terms of volume

Common Storage Kabo	Provision of common storage in Kabo – MSU provided by the Logistics Cluster, and managed by IOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 organisations used the facility (IOM, INTERSOS, WFP) • A total of 117 mt or 347 m3 were stored • IOM was the main user storing 63% in terms of weight or 71% in terms of volume
--------------------------------	---	---

Overall, in terms of common storage, a clear need was identified throughout the period under analysis. The support to the PU-AMI common storage was appreciated, but access to safe storage for all humanitarian actors was not facilitated through the Logistics Cluster, despite several announcements. Additionally, the field hubs reached a limited number of organisations, and WFP was a key user.

Road/Bridges Rehabilitation Services

A plan to undertake limited interventions to rehabilitate bridges across the country was originally part of WFP Logistics Augmentation project, mainly aimed at facilitating access for WFP food distributions. However, in 2014 the Logistics Cluster participating organisations identified the poor status of roads and bridges as a major impediment to the humanitarian logistics response. Therefore, a project to identify and carry out small roads and bridges repair (Mobile Road Intervention Brigade) was developed under the auspices of the Logistics Cluster and in cooperation with ACTED as implementing partner. The UN CERF funded the project, and repairs took place throughout 2015.

The project was highly appreciated by the stakeholders interviewed, and perceived as a highly cost-effective activity. The provision of small-scale repairs to vital roads and bridges – often low cost, but nevertheless essentials– facilitates access to communities and minimises delays in reaching beneficiaries.

While highly appreciated, the project took long to start and significant challenges and areas for improvement were identified particularly in terms of the arrangements defined in the agreement between WFP and ACTED (e.g. type of contracts to be used, payment methods).

4.4. GLOBAL LOGISTIC CLUSTER

The Global Logistics Cluster supports field operations with strategy, policy guidance, mobilisation of resources within the cluster network and provision of surge capacity.²⁵ This is in addition to supporting field operations with systems and partnership linkages, which can help facilitate the field operation obligations.

For the operation in CAR, the Global Logistics Cluster supported with identification of staff for the Logistics Cluster regular positions, a difficult task due to the lack of attractiveness of CAR as duty station; the need for proficiency in French; and the high number of L3 emergencies, with a subsequent lack of qualified available staff. This contributed to a high turnover of Logistics Cluster staff and to periods where the desk officer from the Global Logistics Cluster in Rome covered staffing gaps.

²⁵ Logistics Cluster Global Strategy 2013-2015, Rome, January 2013.

The Logistics Cluster staff in CAR felt that the support from the Global Logistics Cluster could be strengthened in three ways:

- 1) **Qualification/preparation of staff:** provide training for Logistics Cluster Coordinators, clear guidance, and a stronger procedure to ensure handover between coordinators and other staff;
- 2) **Fast support in crises:** ensure consistent support when challenges arise in the field, for example through higher continuity of desk officers responsible for a specific operation;
- 3) **High-level support from Global Logistics Cluster:** when roles and responsibilities of the Logistics Cluster are unclear at the Country Office level and decisions at senior level are required.

At the same time, WFP in CAR felt that the Logistics Cluster was understaffed and underfunded compared to the expectations on the scope of its work. In addition, funding for Logistics Cluster activities were not available and, in order to sustain the operation, WFP funding had to be directed to the Logistics Cluster and this was perceived as limiting the ability for proper planning.

WFP also experienced gaps in senior management positions, both Country Director and Head of Logistics, for long periods of the time. In addition, WFP staff did not have extra capacity to support the Logistics Cluster with HR and administration issues. To avoid this bottleneck, in situations where WFP Country Office does not have additional capacity to adequately support the Logistics Cluster operation, it was suggested in interviews to include administrative staff in the Logistics Cluster budget. In addition, in underfunded operations like CAR, it was suggested to secure initial start-up funding from the Global Logistics Cluster Special Account to adequately kick-start the operation – applying a “no regrets” policy.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the above outlined findings a number of recommendations are summarised here below as well as in the recommendation matrix in chapter 6.

5.1. COORDINATION

The performance of the Logistics Cluster was perceived to have significantly improved in 2015. The key reasons for the improvement lay in the stability and continuity of the Logistics Cluster Coordinator throughout the year; the skillset of the coordinator; the presence of a co-facilitator; and increased support from WFP Logistics.

The main cause for the poor coordination performance in the initial phase of the response was identified to be the overall lack of commitment and support from the lead agency, WFP, to the Logistics Cluster, making it impossible to adequately address the identified gaps particularly in relation to facilitation of transport and storage.

Strong leadership, employing the right skillset, and ensuring continuity in operations is crucial for a relevant, effective, and efficient coordination of the humanitarian response. WFP's commitment at the highest level of the organisation on cluster leadership, as described in the Executive Director's Circular OED2013/016 on WFP Leadership in IASC Clusters, needs to also be translated into the same level of commitment at the operational/country level. Neglecting this obligation can entail a significant reputational risk affecting not only the Logistics Cluster, but also WFP regular operations. The Directive clearly outlines the responsibilities and accountabilities of WFP and WFP management (Global Logistics Cluster, Regional Bureau and Country Director) including proactive support and leadership of the Logistics Cluster, active participation in cluster coordination, consultation between Country Office and Global Logistics Cluster and ensuring sufficient and adequate staffing and facilities for the Logistics Cluster to function as intended.

WFP internal Lesson Learned exercise for CAR, published in December 2015, recommend to establish a procedure to ensure that WFP staff assigned to lead an emergency (including the Logistics Cluster response) has the required qualifications, including a sound understanding of the importance of a proactive leadership role in the cluster system. The Global Logistics Cluster is recommended to support this by raising awareness on the cluster mandate, responsibilities and requirements and to develop a strategy drawing on other agencies interest and capacity to manage and implement Logistics Cluster activities. The aim is to base the response on the strongest logistics set-up in country and thus, involving organisations more proactively from the onset of the emergency.

In terms of Logistics Cluster staff, investing in Logistics Cluster Coordinator and Information Management training is essential. Also crucial is to identify ways to minimise staff turnover – including reviewing the mechanisms for staff recruitment and retention. Furthermore it is key for Logistics Cluster staff to understand structure and ways of working of the organisations they work with and for; as such, having NGO experience can be considered a valuable asset, as well as being familiar with WFP and its structures.

5.2. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

While the Logistics Cluster Information Management function was appreciated, it could have played a larger and more important role in CAR. Building of trust; facilitating information sharing and collaboration; and contributing to increase the visibility of the humanitarian crisis in CAR, are all areas that could have been strengthened contributing to make the humanitarian response more effective and efficient.

It is recommended for the Global Logistics Cluster to raise awareness on the importance of Information Management (IM staff was also highlighted as key staff in the WFP Executive Director's Circular OED2013/016) and through consultations with the Logistics Cluster at country level ensure the deployment of skilled and trained staff. Overall, the IM function is crucial to raise awareness on logistics gaps and bottlenecks. When Logistics Cluster budgets are formulated, it is highly recommended to include provisions for the IM function from the onset of the operation clearly explaining the necessity and benefits of the position.

Specifically for CAR, it is recommended for the IM Officer to work on expanding the range of products available to the humanitarian actors in the country including updating the Logistics Capacity Assessment (LCA), establishing a regular

schedule for IM products such as Assessments, Situation Updates, Infographics, Snapshots, Operations Overview and communication products; and disseminating the information using the standard mailing system, as well as the dedicated webpage.

5.3. COMMON LOGISTICS SERVICES FACILITATION

The Logistics Cluster is not a Legal entity and it depends on other entities to provide common services. In most cases, the Logistics Cluster can take advantage of WFP extensive logistics set-up; in CAR, however, this collaboration was limited. Even though a fruitful collaboration was put in place to facilitate information on common storage managed by PU-AMI, the Logistics Cluster did not facilitate access to storage for all humanitarian actors.

WFP's capacity to take on a leading role in providing services to the humanitarian community was hindered by lack of commitment and staffing. When services were offered by WFP, agencies felt the support did not materialise. WFP, on the other hand, felt the agencies did not clearly formulate their requirements hence impeding an appropriate response set-up. WFP senior management (the Country Director or the Emergency Coordinator), as representative of the Logistics Cluster, is accountable for delivering on the commitments set out but due to discontinuity in senior management staffing, WFP common service commitments were not maintained.

If common services are required in an operation, it is necessary to ensure that experienced staff is hired to set up the operation and that adequate administrative staff is available to support it. Not all WFP operations have experience with common service delivery nor have a system for handling cost-recovery services and service delivery in place. While a Logistics Cluster operation can leverage on WFP set-up, it does add an extra workload, which the WFP operation may not be geared to sustain.

For the Logistics Cluster, it is recommended to develop a common service strategy that takes the capacity issue into consideration. The strategy can outline the gaps, an implementation plan and request all humanitarian actors to indicate areas where they might be able/willing to fill a gap on behalf of the humanitarian community. This strategy should include a risk assessment and ensure financial as well as administrative and managerial support for the operation, as the accountability will remain with WFP as designated lead of the Logistics Cluster.

5.4. GLOBAL LOGISTIC CLUSTER

The Global Logistics Cluster support was seen as mainly absent in particular in situations when Logistics Cluster staff needed support in asserting the cluster mandate and role. It is recommended to clearly define the level and type of support which can be provided by the Global Logistics Cluster, as well as mechanisms for increasing the engagement and support of the GLC Coordinator in similar situations. The Global Logistics Cluster has a supportive not supervisory role, however, consultations between the Logistics Cluster at country level (and WFP Country Director) and the Global Logistics Cluster are a minimum requirement for activation/deactivation, management, staffing and structure on the Logistics Cluster operation.²⁶ It is recommended for the Global Logistics Cluster to raise awareness of the mandate, roles

²⁶ Executive Director's Circular OED2013/016, WFP Leadership in IASC Clusters, 21 August 2013

and responsibilities at all levels as well as to ensure the support is available when required (including ensuring continuity of the Desk Officers).

Additional support in terms of financial management of a Logistics Cluster budget is recommended, for example through training WFP Country Office staff, and through the inclusion of financial management in Logistics Cluster Coordinator training.

In terms of funds availability, the Logistics Cluster has access to limited available funds for employing a 'no regrets' policy and funding staff until other sources of funding become available. The Logistics Cluster can also loan funds from WFP's working capital and from the Immediate Response Account. It is recommended to review this practice and see how to best use it in different emergency scenarios and if the mechanism is sufficient as is.

Promoting the Logistics Cluster role and responsibility through training of WFP staff in countries with a Logistics Cluster operation can also be recommended to increase the understanding and support for the operation.

In CAR, the presence of a co-facilitator and the rehabilitation project through ACTED were highly appreciated and it is recommended for the Global Logistics Cluster to develop "Logistics Cluster templates for arrangements entailing NGOs taking a lead role in cluster coordination and/or and service provision. Agreements for rehabilitation projects, can be developed together with WFP engineering unit through the Access Group.

6. MATRIX - OVERVIEW OF KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS	
I	Ensuring WFP Proactive Leadership of the Logistics Cluster
II	Investment in staff – skill set and continuity
III	Investment in Common Services – skill set and investment requirements
IV	Ensure continued and aligned GLC support
LOGISTICS CLUSTER FUNCTIONS	
1. COORDINATION	
1.1	WFP Leadership – ensuring proactive leadership and commitment to the Logistics Cluster at all
1.2	Continuity – Identify ways to strengthen continuity – including review of mechanisms for staff
1.3	Staff skill set – invest in training of Logistics Cluster staff
2. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT	
2.1	Invest in IM to facilitate the humanitarian response through increased access to operational information, building of trust and collaboration, promotion of information sharing, and increase visibility of the crisis in CAR
3. LOGISTICS SERVICE FACILITATION	
3.1	Ensure commitment and investment in service delivery set-up
3.2	Ensure sufficient staffing for service delivery
4. GLOBAL LOGISTICS CLUSTER SUPPORT	
4.1	Develop mechanisms for consistent GLC support
4.2	Financial management – training of Logistics Cluster Coordinator and WFP CO staff as required
4.3	Training of WFP staff in Logistics Cluster role and responsibilities in countries with operations
4.4	Systematise the engagement of humanitarian actors’ logistics assets on the ground to build the logistics response on already existing capacities, network and infrastructures – develop agreements and procedures for the agreements

ANNEX 1 - PEOPLE CONSULTED

Organisation	Role	Name and position	Date and location of interview
ACF	Logistics Cluster user	Julien Schouvey, Emergency Pool Logistics Coordinator and LC Coordinator in 2013	31 October 2015, Bangui
ACTED	Logistics Cluster user and cooperating partner	Samy Guessabi, Logistics Coordinator, and Francois Raynaud, Technical Coordinator	30 October 2015, Bangui
CCO	Logistics Cluster user	Jean Claude Savary, Inter NGO Coordinator	28 October 2015, Bangui
Croix Rouge France (CRF)	Logistics Cluster user	Adonis Itongolo, Logistics Coordinator	28 October 2015, Bangui
CRS	Logistics Cluster user	Didier Mashariki, Supply Chain Manager	29 October 2015, Bangui
DRC	Logistics Cluster user	Anne Claire Divat, Logistics and Supply Officer	30 October 2015, Bangui
ECHO	Donor	Marianna Franco, Technical Assistant	28 October 2015, Bangui
Handicap International	Logistics Cluster user and cooperating partner	Matthieu Lacourt, Co-facilitator, Handicap International/Logistics Cluster	31 October 2015, Bangui
ICRC	Logistics Cluster user	Ruben Naval Artal, Logistics Coordinator	30 October 2015, Bangui
IRC	Logistics Cluster user	Baysah Kortj, Operations Manager	29 October 2015, Bangui
OCHA	Coordination	Caroline Peguet, Head of Office/ Field Coordination	1 November 2015, Bangui
OCHA	Coordination	Alexis Kamanzi, Head of Civil-Military Coordination Unit	2 November 2015, Bangui
PU-AMI	Logistics Cluster user & cooperating partner	Michael Mosset, Logistics Coordinator	29 October 2015, Bangui
Save the Children	Logistics Cluster user	Ano A. Assemian, Logistics Manager	3 November 2015, Bangui
Solidarites	Logistics Cluster user	Luca Fasolino, Logistics Coordinator	29 October 2015, Bangui
UNHCR	Logistics Cluster user	Mugisho Mushobekwa, Associate Fleet Management Officer	3 November 2015, Bangui
UNICEF	Logistics Cluster user	Essau Ngatta, Supply Logistics Manager	3 November 2015, Bangui
Welthungerhilfe	Logistics Cluster user	Stephane Pauwels, Logistics Coordinator	30 October 2015, Bangui
WFP	WFP	Bienvenu Djossa, Country Director	2 November 2015, Bangui
WFP	WFP	Guy Adoua, Deputy Country Director	2 November 2015, Bangui
WFP	WFP	Christian Fortier, Head of Logistics	29 October 2015, Bangui
WFP	Logistics Cluster	Nicolas Brule/ Christian Fortier	30 October 2015, Bangui
WFP	WFP	Aboubakry Kane, Logistics Officer	30 October 2015, Bangui
WFP	Logistics Cluster	Nicolas Brule, LC Coordinator	28 October 2015, Bangui
WFP	UNHAS	Eric Moussard, Chief Air Transport Officer	30 October 2015, Bangui
WFP	Logistics Cluster	Gilles Cimetiere, CAR GLC and LC coordinator 2014	29 October 2015, Skype
WFP	Logistics Cluster	Julien Marcheix, CAR GLC and IM Officer 2014	11 November 2015, Rome
WFP	Logistics Cluster	Kim Claveau, CAR Logistics Coordinator 2014	17 November 2015, Skype
WFP	Emergency Coordinator	Carlos Veloso, CAR Emergency Coordinator 2013-2014	20 November 2015, Skype
WFP	WFP Engineering Unit	Deen Cairns, WFP Engineer/Access Group representative	12 November 2015, Rome

ANNEX 2 – DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

EVALUATION DOCUMENTS

OECD-DAC, OECD-DAC evaluation criteria (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committee)

<http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/2754804.pdf>

ALNAP, Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria, An ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies

<http://www.alnap.org/resource/5253.aspx>

IASC

IASC, Reference Module for Inter-agency Cluster Coordination at Country Level, revised July 2015

IASC, Provider of Last Resort

<http://interagencystandingcommittee.org/other/documents-public/operational-guidance-provider-last-resort>

LOGISTICS CLUSTER STRATEGY AND OTHER DOCUMENTS – available at www.logcluster.org

Logistics Cluster Global Strategy 2013-2015, Rome, January 2013

Joint Evaluation of the Global Logistics Cluster, prepared by the KonTerra Group, August 2012 – supported by WFP, UNICEF and the Government of Netherlands

Logistics Cluster Global Strategy 2016-2018, Draft, Rome, February 2016

Global Meeting Budapest November 2015, NFR:

<http://www.logcluster.org/global-meeting-document/logistics-cluster-global-meeting-budapest-note-record-nfr>

LOGISTICS CLUSTER CAR DOCUMENTS – available at <http://www.logcluster.org/ops/caf13a>

Logistics Cluster, 4 Concept of Operations, CAR (first one from 20 August 2013, last one 11 August 2014)

Logistics Cluster, Standard Operating Procedures, CAR, 11 August 2014

Logistics Cluster, 1 Snapshot

Logistics Cluster, 52 Meeting minutes

Logistics Cluster, 28 Maps

Logistics Cluster, 3 Operations Overview

Logistics Cluster, 2 Surveys October-November 2015

Logistics Capacity Assessment (LCA)

<http://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/Central+African+Republic>

UNHAS, 65 Flight schedules

OCHA AND UN CAR DOCUMENTS – some available here: <http://www.unocha.org/car>

OCHA, Common Humanitarian Fund, Annual Report 2012

OCHA, Common Humanitarian Fund, Annual Report 2013

OCHA, Common Humanitarian Fund, Annual Report 2014

OCHA, CAR Consolidated Appeal Mid-Year Review 2013

<https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyCountryDetails&cc=caf&yr=2013>

OCHA, Financial Tracking Services, Tracking Global Humanitarian Aid Flows, CAR:

<https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyCountryDetails&cc=caf>

OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshot, October 2015

OCHA, Humanitarian Dashboard CAR, 2013, 2014, 2015

OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2015, October 2014

OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan for 2015, December 2014

OCHA, Operational Presence (3W), 2014-2015,

OCHA, Situation Reports CAR – 2013-2015

MINUSCA: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusca/background.shtml>

Security Council Briefing on CAR by Under-Secretary General and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos, 14 August 2013

OTHER BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS

Food Security Cluster, Lessons Learned in the Central African Republic Food Security Cluster, Synthesis Report 2014

ICVA, NGO Perspectives on Humanitarian Response in Level 3 Crises, International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), IMPACT, January 2015

UNDP, Human Development Report 2015: <http://report.hdr.undp.org/>

WORLD BANK, The Central African Republic's Infrastructure: A Continental Perspective, Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic, 2011

WFP INTERNAL DOCUMENTS

Handover and end of mission reports from 3 Cluster Coordinators and 1 Information Officer

WFP budgets, narratives and financial tracking for Special Operation 200605 'Logistics Support to WFP operations, and Logistics & Emergency Telecommunications Cluster Augmentation in Central African Republic'

WFP, WFP Management Response to the Recommendations of the Summary Evaluation Report, Global Logistics Cluster, Report for Consideration for WFP Executive Board, Second Regular Session, 12-14 November 2012

WFP, Executive Director's Circular OED2013/016, WFP Leadership in IASC Clusters, 21 August 2013

WFP, Lessons Learned for the WFP CAR Response, draft version 15 December 2015

ANNEX 3 – MISSION TERMS OF REFERENCE

<u>Date:</u>	23 - 30 October 2015
<u>Location:</u>	Central African Republic
<u>Team Members:</u>	Alexis Ottenwaelter, Logistics Officer, ACF seconded to GLC Rome Dorte Friis, Logistics Officer, GLC Rome QA: TBD

Country Situation Background

The Central African Republic (CAR) has been going through a complex and continuous crisis since the events of 2013. The degradation of the socio-economic infrastructure, the weak redeployment of the state and engineering services in the prefectures, the crumbling of social cohesion and of the socio-economic fabric after recurring violent crises, have had considerable humanitarian consequences, causing the displacement of thousands of people.

The security situation has somewhat improved in 2015, particularly in Bangui, and in the West of the country, allowing the return of some of the displaced population; however, the situation remains extremely volatile in both urban and rural settings. End of September 2015, the security situation has deteriorated once again in Bangui. Looting, fighting and roadblocks erected have worsened an already dire humanitarian situation, impeding the ability of aid partners to gain access to thousands of internally displaced people and assess needs. Moreover, this undermines efforts undertaken to implement the return plan for internally displaced persons set-up by the Humanitarian Country Team.

Country Logistics Cluster Operational Background

Generally, the country suffers from a lack of logistics infrastructure. When existing, the infrastructure is limited and in a very poor state. In addition, insecurity remains a major constraint to the implementation of an efficient Logistics supply in country.

The Logistics Cluster has been active since 2007 in CAR. Due to the escalation of violence in 2013, there was a need for augmenting the logistics response to support humanitarian actors with the implementation of their emergency programmes. In July 2013, the Logistics Cluster set up an operation providing:

- Coordination among actors to facilitate a unified response effort on the behalf of the humanitarian community to minimise duplication of logistics activities during the response;
- Information Management to ensure an efficient and effective response through promotion and facilitate sharing of logistics information among all organisations;
- To facilitate receipt and onwards delivery of relief materials, common storage premises in Bangui and in identified areas in country were set up;

- Infrastructure rehabilitation and maintenance (roads, bridges, airstrips) to facilitate access to the affected areas.

CAR LLE Objective

Following the above, the overall objectives of the Lessons Learned exercise for the Logistics Cluster operation in CAR are therefore:

- 1) To assess the performance of the CAR Logistics Cluster operation and the activities undertaken by the Logistics Cluster in CAR in particular in terms of relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the operation in identifying the gaps and addressing the needs of the humanitarian community through provided services.
- 2) To draw lessons and recommendations from the CAR operation to support the CAR Logistics Cluster for further improved performance in future operations, but also to support the development of the Global Logistics Cluster through the identification of best practices across operations.

Scope of the LLE

To assess the performance of the Logistics Cluster operation and draw lessons and recommendations, the Lessons Learned exercise will focus on the Logistics Cluster's core functions at country level – the sectoral coordination, the direct common logistics service provision, and its facilitating role for the humanitarian actors.

Specifically, the LLE will look at:

- 1) The relevance and appropriateness of the Logistics Cluster response – how were local needs and priorities identified, and the subsequent Cluster operation designed and implemented?
- 2) The effectiveness of the Logistics Cluster response – did the Cluster operation meet the stated objectives in a timely fashion?
- 3) The efficiency of the Logistics Cluster response – how efficient were available resources used for the implementation of the Logistics Cluster operation?

The Logistics Cluster operation in CAR cannot be meaningfully analyzed without also considering the supporting framework in form of the Global Logistics Cluster and constraining factors (funding and HR).

Further, in support of the current Cluster operation, the LLE will also:

- 4) Collect feedback from stakeholders on future needs to inform the future strategy of the Cluster operation in CAR.

Methodology:

Data for the Lessons Learned report will be collected through:

- 1) Desk review of key documents prior to the mission in country;
- 2) User surveys – feedback from users who were in CAR in July 2013 and current users of the Cluster;

- 3) Staff surveys - feedback from key Cluster staff through the Staff debrief survey;
- 4) Quantitative data related to the cluster services;
- 5) Single or group interviews in country with Key Informants (Users of services, Government representatives, Coordinating institutions (Cluster, HC, HCT) and others as relevant).

Output

The Lessons Learned Team will produce a report summarising the key findings and recommendations. The final draft will be sent to the WFP CO management and Logistics Cluster stakeholders for their review and comments as well. The final report will be cleared by the Director of OSL before findings and recommendations will be shared at a Global level for feedback from global stakeholders.

ANNEX 4 - OVERVIEW OF SURVEY RESULTS

<http://www.logcluster.org/document/car-lessons-learned-report-annex-4-overview-survey-results-february-2016>

ANNEX 5 – ACCRONYMS

ACCRONYM	
ACF	Action Against Hunger
ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
ALNAP	The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
CAR	Central African Republic
CCO	Committee for Inter-NGO Coordination
CERF	United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
ConOPS	Logistics Cluster Concept of Operation
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECHO	European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department
GLC	Global Logistics Cluster
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICCG	Inter-Cluster Coordination Group
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
INGOs	International Non-Government-Organisations
IM	Information Management
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
LLE	Lessons Learned Exercise
Mt	Metric tonnes
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in CAR
MSU	Mobile Storage Unit
NFI	Non-Food-Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee
PU-AMI	Première Urgence Internationale
RITA	Relief Item Tracking System
SitRep	Situation Report
SO	Special Operation
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme