



UKRAINE

LESSONS LEARNED REPORT

April 2016



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As part of the Global Logistics Cluster strategy, a Lessons Learned Exercise was commissioned in December 2015 in Ukraine. The objective of the exercise was to identify best practices and areas for improvement to be replicated across operations globally. Particular focus was given to draw lessons from an operation

where WFP, the lead agency of the Logistics Cluster, had limited presence in country at the time of activation of the cluster.

At the time of the mission, the Logistics Cluster operation in Ukraine was found to be highly appreciated by most of the stakeholders consulted, and considered relevant, appropriate, effective and

efficient in addressing the identified logistics gaps and bottlenecks. Conversely, the limited presence of the lead agency and a high turnover of international staff in the Logistics Cluster were found to have contributed negatively to the response.

Two main themes were identified as having influenced the performance of the response:

Humanitarian Coordination and Leadership: The UN System in Ukraine and the programme implemented were mainly structured around the social and economic development agenda, therefore prior to the crisis UN staff in Ukraine had limited experience with the humanitarian response architecture, roles and responsibilities and with emergency operations. This weakness paired with significant access challenges –

particularly accessing beneficiaries in the Non-Government Controlled Areas – exacerbated the need for leadership and strong coordination. Humanitarian actors including the lead agency of the Logistics Cluster – the World Food Programme (WFP) – were not present in Ukraine before the crisis and they had to start operations without the support of a structure in place. The actors that were already present in the country were implementing developing programmes hence had to set up separate operations to provide a significant humanitarian response. The Logistics Cluster response was appreciated but was challenged by limited leadership at the start of the activation, delayed logistics setup, high staff turnover, and limited available support from the Global Logistics Cluster.

ENSURE STRONG LEADERSHIP

In a similar setting, it is recommended to strengthen the leadership of the Logistics Cluster. Usually WFP, as lead agency, provides support through its senior management in country, raising challenges and constraints of the response in high level coordination meetings. Alternatively, a strong Logistics Cluster Coordinator takes on the role.

Recommended action: Strengthen Leadership and staff and response capacity of the Logistics Cluster

In cases where there is no, or limited, WFP logistics capacity on the ground, it is recommended to deploy a strong Logistics Cluster Coordinator and, where feasible, explore the possibility to temporary transfer part of the leadership to another agency. This would ensure that that the role of

Logistics Cluster activation in countries with no WFP setup: The fact that the lead agency, WFP, did not have a logistics set-up in Ukraine delayed the kick-off of the Logistics Cluster operation.

DEVELOP STRATEGY AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING

To be prepared to respond to emergencies in countries with no, or limited, WFP presence, it is recommended to design common service delivery strategies and implementation options allowing for quick operation scale up either by expanding WFP capacity, or by transferring leadership to other organisations with greater implementation potential.

Recommended action: Develop Strategy and Contingency Planning for cluster activation in countries with limited or no WFP capacity

Therefore, it is recommended that WFP and the Global Logistics Cluster initiate discussions with other agencies evolving around temporary leadership responsibilities or staff support until the Logistic

humanitarian logistics in a response is clarified and fully taken into consideration at the highest level. Furthermore, co-leadership is in line with the partnership focus brought forward in the Global Logistics Cluster strategy 2016-2018.

In terms of staff resources, a high turnover of staff is detrimental to any operation. It is recommended to review the recruitment and retention strategy for the Logistics Cluster to ensure qualified staff are available for immediate deployment as well as for longer assignments. This could include additional training to ensure the resource base is well qualified to effectively manage different types of emergencies and the related tasks.

At global level, it is recommended to clearly define the support the Global Logistics Cluster can provide, and subsequently align staff and resources with the number of active operations. In an emergency where there is limited lead agency presence in country, as was the case in Ukraine, ensuring adequate and relevant support from the Global Logistics Cluster is particularly critical.

Cluster is activated and operationalised. This is in line with the Global Logistics Cluster strategy for 2016-2018 which focuses on preparedness, partnership and on establishing an effective platform for supporting Logistics Cluster operations.



1. INTRODUCTION

As part of the Global Logistics Cluster (GLC) strategy to ensure cluster's accountability to all stakeholders, the GLC commissioned a Lessons Learned Exercise (LLE) for the Logistics Cluster operation in Ukraine.

The exercise was initiated in November 2015 and included a field mission in December 2015. The Ukraine operation was chosen as it represents an example of the sudden need for a large scale humanitarian operation in a country with no recent large-scale humanitarian crises.

1.1. LESSONS LEARNED EXERCISE OBJECTIVE

The overall objectives of the Lessons Learned Exercise on the Logistics Cluster operation in Ukraine were:

1. To assess the performance and quality of the activities undertaken by the Logistics Cluster in Ukraine to support the humanitarian community in reaching the people in need of assistance. The operation was assessed in terms of the level of relevance/appropriateness, efficiency, and effectiveness in identifying gaps and addressing the needs of the humanitarian community.¹
2. To draw lessons and recommendations to support both the Ukraine Logistics Cluster performance in the future and the development of the GLC through the identification of best practices across operations. One particular area of interest was to draw lessons on the activation of the Logistics Cluster in settings where the lead agency, WFP, had limited presence and initial capacity.

The focus of the LLE is on the Logistics Cluster's function as a coordination mechanism as designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).

1.2. METHODOLOGY

A standard methodology for conducting Lessons Learned exercises was developed in 2014. This methodology was applied to the Ukraine LLE. Quantitative and qualitative research methods were used to better understand the operation and the main issues that influenced it. Hence the findings are based on the analysis of quantitative data on the operation, crossed with qualitative data collected from stakeholders, namely their perception of the Logistics Cluster performance.

The data was collected through:

- a) **A desk review** of key documents and Logistics Cluster staff feedback (see Annex 2 for an overview of documents consulted).
- b) **Interview with 34 key stakeholders:** face-to-face interviews in Kiev and Donetsk and Skype interviews with key stakeholders outside of Ukraine. The interviewees were key users of the Logistics Cluster services (UN agencies and NGOs), donors, representatives of the humanitarian community in Ukraine (OCHA, NGO

¹ The evaluation criteria are based on OECD-DAC criteria (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committee, and 'Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria, An ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies')

Forum),² Logistics Cluster staff (including seconded staff), and WFP staff (see Annex 1 for overview of people and organisations consulted).

- c) **User Surveys:** Information from a survey sent to Logistics Cluster participants in Ukraine through the Logistics Cluster mailing list - 26 responses in the period 1-18 December 2015³ – (see Annex 3 for overview of key survey results).

The data collected was used to assess the performance of the operation in terms of:

- **Relevance/appropriateness** in responding to the identified and prioritised needs and how well it was adapted to the local requirements;
- **Efficiency:** how economically the Logistics Cluster inputs and resources were converted into results;
- **Effectiveness:** whether the objectives of the operation were achieved in a timely manner.

The LLE team was composed of three key members:

1. Dorte Friis, Team leader, Logistics Officer, GLC, Copenhagen;
2. Jeppe Andersen, Team member, Logistics Officer, GLC, Rome;
3. Tom Olsen, Team member, Emergency Supply and Logistics Specialist, UNICEF, Copenhagen

Quality Assurance and Feedback from Logistics Cluster Participating Organisations

To ensure the validity of findings, the following Quality Assurance measures have been implemented:

- a) Presentation of key findings to WFP Country Office and Logistics Cluster key staff during and at the end of the field mission;
- b) Presentation of key findings to GLC, Rome including a “reality check” on the recommendations;
- c) Draft report review and feedback provided by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) and WHO, namely:
 - Sara Bertilsson, Unit for Operations, MSB;
 - Hanna Norell, Project Manager, MSB;
 - Patricia Kormoss, Emergency Operation Manager and Health Cluster Coordinator, WHO Ukraine;
 - Olexander Babanin, Supply Officer, Surge and Crisis Support Team, Department of Emergency Risk Management and Humanitarian Response, WHO.
- d) Feedback on the draft report from Logistics Cluster and WFP staff in Ukraine and from the GLC. The report findings will be presented at the GLC annual meeting in June 2016 for discussion.

1.3. LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINS

There were three main limitations for the exercise:

² Attempts were made to meet the Humanitarian Coordinator or a representative from his office; however this was not possible.

³ The survey was sent to 166 people from 44 organisations and 26 people responded. This amounts to 22 percent of the total people invited.

1. Stakeholders consulted: Due to the nature of the conflict, no authorities have been consulted (on both sides of the conflict) as it might attract unnecessary and counterproductive attention to the humanitarian response. The response challenges and requirements portrayed in the report are therefore limited to the experience of the humanitarian actors consulted (see Annex 1);
2. Timing of exercise: The mission was conducted ten months into the Logistics Cluster response but 18 months after some actors started providing humanitarian assistance. The situation and challenges have changed over time, as well as the responding actors. First responders have been interviewed to cover the period prior to the activation of the Logistics Cluster. Logistics Cluster staff present throughout the ten months of operation have been consulted. The findings may however be biased towards challenges relevant to the most recent period;
3. Survey: The response rate to the survey was satisfactory (see footnote 3 and Annex 3), and the responses obtained were in line with findings of the interviews. It is the opinion of the LL team that the main issues have been identified by combining the survey with the interviews.



2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

2.1. HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT

Since the spring of 2014, Ukraine has suffered from repeated armed conflicts which resulted in a sudden and large number of people in need of various forms of humanitarian assistance in the eastern parts of the country. While the Humanitarian Response Plan for 2016 has not been released yet, the funding requirements have been set to US\$ 298 million, targeting 2.5 million people out of 3.1 million people in need including 1.1 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).⁴ The development in humanitarian needs from mid-2014 is summarised in Table 1.

Table 1 - Overview of Humanitarian Needs and funding from August 2014 to 2016

	2014 ⁵	2015 ⁶	2016 ⁷
People in need	3.9 million	5 million	3.1 million
People targeted	Evolving	3.2 million	2.5 million
Funding requirements	US\$ 33 million	US\$ 316 million	US\$ 298 million
Funding obtained	US\$ 32 million (96%)	US\$ 183 million (58%)	US\$ 16 million (6%)

In terms of humanitarian response, a few NGOs started providing humanitarian assistance during the summer of 2014, while the UN agencies present in Ukraine compiled a preliminary Response Plan in August 2014 mainly relying on its development oriented capacity. At the end of 2014, the crisis was overwhelming the capacity of the national systems and large scale humanitarian operations were initiated. In December 2014, several clusters were officially activated, namely: Education, Emergency Shelter and NFI, Food, Nutrition, Health, Protection, and WASH.⁸ The Logistics Cluster was activated on 23 February 2015 following a request from the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and a subsequent assessment mission.⁹

The first constraint for the response in Ukraine was the global recognition of the crisis and subsequent activation of the humanitarian response. The second main constraint was the lack of humanitarian capacity and actors in country.

4 Humanitarian Bulletin Ukraine, Issue 06, 12 February 2016, OCHA

5 Humanitarian Bulletin Ukraine, Issue 06, 12 February 2016, OCHA

6 Preliminary Response Plan, August 15, 2014 covering August-December 2014 (only UN), OCHA and Ukraine Situation report No.22, 26 December 2014, OCHA

7 Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2015, published December 2014, OCHA and Ukraine, HRP 2015 Achievement, OCHA

8 <http://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-2015-humanitarian-response-plan-revised-enuk>

9 <http://www.logcluster.org/document/meeting-minutes-kyiv-02-march-2015>

The initial response was highly dependent on in-country capacity, which was directed towards the social and economic development agenda and not geared to a humanitarian response.

When the humanitarian response was initiated, the key challenge was access to the affected population in the Non-Government Controlled Areas (NGCA) (see map in Annex 4). Access and delivery of life saving relief items and services were challenged by armed groups, active conflicts, lack of permission for humanitarian organisations to operate in the NGCA and extensive bureaucracy on the Ukrainian side. The humanitarian response and access to people in need in the Government Controlled Areas (GCA) did not pose significant challenges.¹⁰

2.2. LOGISTICS GAPS

Following the above, the needs assessment conducted in February 2015 identified the following gaps:

Coordination: As the UN System and most humanitarian actors were not present in Ukraine prior to the crisis, they had to start operations without the support of a structure in place. The actors already in the country were implementing developing programmes hence had to set up separate operations to provide a significant humanitarian response. Therefore coordination was identified as a necessary component to facilitate a unified humanitarian logistics response minimising duplication and targeting resources to the prioritised logistics gaps.¹¹

Information Management: Due to the ‘young’ nature of the humanitarian operation, Information Management was regarded as vital to an efficient and effective response. Furthermore, as the security and access situation changed constantly, sharing relevant logistics information among all organisations was identified as an important component to the response.

Advocacy/technical support to the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) to address logistics bottlenecks: In particular the need for developing simplified procedures for humanitarian actors to obtain permission to deliver humanitarian cargo to the NGCA was seen as a key gap to address.

Supporting the Humanitarian Community accessing the NGCA with relief items: due to the limited logistics setup and humanitarian response experience of organisations in Ukraine, and in order to maintain access to the affected



¹⁰ Currently, there is a significant humanitarian response in the GCA of the eastern provinces, where the latest estimates indicate 2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. [OCHA Humanitarian Dash Board Jan-Nov 2015](#)

Many beneficiaries are reached through extensive cash and voucher programmes through existing commercial options and government authorities. There is easy access for humanitarian and any support and programme related relief items and goods can easily be procured locally or imported to Ukraine and transported to the areas where it is needed.

¹¹ OCHA 3W (Who does What and Where) was completed from February 2015 onwards; however, nationwide comparable data is only available from April 2015, when there were 106 organisations operating across Ukraine. This increased to 140 organisations in December 2015.

https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/3w_overview_partners_17032015.pdf

https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/3w_overview_partners_20151231_v3.pdf

population in an effective, efficient, and safe manner, facilitation of transport, and later of humanitarian convoys, was identified as crucial.

2.3. LOGISTICS CLUSTER RESPONSE

In response to the identified needs, and with the main overall objective being to support humanitarian organisations in accessing the affected population in the NGCA, the Logistics Cluster established an operation with four objectives outlined in Table 2.¹²

Table 2 - Overview of Logistics Cluster Operation in Ukraine

Special Operation 200281 “Logistics Cluster Support to the Humanitarian Response in Ukraine”	
Objectives	Gaps
<i>Objective 1 Contribute to enhance predictability, timeliness and efficiency of the emergency response under the Cluster approach by providing Logistics Coordination and Information Management</i>	Coordination and Information Management
<i>Objective 2 Support the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) in its advocacy role / strategy to overcome logistics bottlenecks in order to access affected people in the conflict zone</i>	Advocacy and technical support to the HCT
<i>Objective 3 Coordinate inter-agency convoys to access the affected population, if and when needed</i>	Access through coordinated convoys
<i>Objective 4 Facilitate consolidation of cargo and common transport and storage services on behalf of the humanitarian community to address key logistics constraints and to allow safer and coordinated access, if and as needed</i>	Addressing specific logistics bottlenecks to delivery of relief items

Operation size

¹² Special Operation Ukraine SO 200821: ‘Logistics Cluster Support to the Humanitarian Response in Ukraine’. WFP Project Narrative, February 2015.

The operation was launched on 1 March 2015 for an initial period of six months, with a total budget of US\$ 1.8 million. The project was later extended twice and the budget revised accordingly. The current operation will run until 30 June 2016 with a total budget of US\$ 3.1 million. The operation is 68 percent funded with donations and in-kind donations from the European Commission, CERF, Sweden, Denmark and multilateral non-directed contributions.

The initial budget included a Logistics Coordinator, an IM Officer and a Cargo Tracking Officer all based in Kiev. In addition, there was a provision for a Convoy Leader. This was later changed to include staff for Donetsk and civil/military liaison. Covered positions to date are outlined in Table 3 here below:

Staff Overview - Logistics Cluster Operation in Ukraine	
Position	Overview
Logistics Cluster Coordinator	A total of four coordinators have filled this position plus the Deputy Global Coordinator who kicked-off the operation
IM	The position has been filled by two people, and is currently vacant
Civil/Military liaison	One staff from March till July 2015
Logistics staff	Logistics Officers (including cargo tracking), logistics assistants and support assistants. Between two and three staff throughout – a total of seven people
Drivers	Two to three drivers from March/April onwards – a total of four staff

Coordination

Coordination meetings were initially held in Kiev. The Logistics Cluster Coordinator participated in other humanitarian coordination meetings including the Inter-Cluster Working Group. From 7 April 2015, coordination meetings were also held in Donetsk on an ad hoc basis; however from August 2015 only ad hoc bilateral meetings were held due to the reduced access to Donetsk and the limited number of actors present – this will be further discussed in the findings section.

Information Management

Also from August 2013, the Logistics Cluster started facilitating information sharing among the Logistics Cluster participants to minimise duplication of efforts and to provide relevant operational information (access information, road, customs, maps and other relevant information) as required. A Logistics Cluster dedicated webpage already existed.

Logistics Services:

To support the humanitarian community in reaching the affected areas with the needed relief materials, a number of logistics services were facilitated:

1. Intermediate storage/logistics hubs established in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk and Luhansk:

Dnipropetrovsk: A common storage facility (10,000 m²) has been made available to participating organisations including handling in connection with receipt and dispatch of cargo to the NGCA;

Donetsk: A common storage facility (2,000 m²) for intermediate storage within the NGCA;

Luhansk: At the time of the mission, the Logistics Cluster was in the process of acquiring access to a storage facility in Luhansk to facilitate the delivery to the affected population in the area.

2. Process facilitation:

The Logistics Cluster has been facilitating the process of registration. Applying for registration and obtaining approval from the Ukrainian Authorities is required for any organisation intending to transport and deliver relief items into the NGCA. A large part of the activity is navigating in an ever



changing environment. The authorities on both sides have limited experience with establishing this type of process, as a consequence, the procedure is continuously evolving with additional requirements and bureaucratic steps being added.

3. Transport - Convoy facilitation:

The Logistics Cluster initially facilitated transport of humanitarian cargo into the NGCA, from Dnipropetrovsk. In June 2015, this changed into convoy facilitation as the security situation degraded substantially. Both activities include contact line crossing and transport services to Donetsk and Luhansk, with Logistics Cluster staff required to physically escort the convoy and process paperwork at the various stages.

3. LOGISTICS CLUSTER IN UKRAINE HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT

Ukraine has not in recent times experienced a large scale humanitarian crisis and the subsequent need for an international response. Prior to the outbreak of violence in eastern Ukraine there was no humanitarian organisation or large scale operations in Ukraine. The organisations present were implementing development programmes and charity activities, and the initial response was therefore limited in terms of humanitarian capacity and knowledge.

This had three immediate consequences:

1. Humanitarian operations in many cases started without the backing of an established office, staff with country experience, or regular administrative in country support;
2. Little awareness at national level on the humanitarian architecture, including the cluster approach, meant that humanitarian actors (UN and civil society) had to spend time on explaining their role and responsibilities to the authorities and on creating the space, prove the capacity and the need for their organisation;
3. National recruited staff had not previously been involved in humanitarian operations and needed training on the humanitarian system.

The above factors caused delays in the response which - combined with a strained humanitarian system, especially in terms of human resources, due to multiple L3 emergencies and the Ebola outbreak - constrained the effectiveness of the response. The Logistics Cluster operation was therefore also affected.

In addition, due to the nature of the conflict and the related security and political issues, coordination outside of Kiev, and consequently access to the affected population, was challenging. In July 2015, the NGCA de facto authorities blocked all access for humanitarian actors in Donetsk and Luhansk, requiring a renewed registration process.

Coordination with all parties to the conflict has been dominated by the need to establish proving, lasting, and trusting relationships, which seems to have depended on the principle of the 'fewer actors and more invisible operations the better'. This need for not disrupting the established order in particular in the NGCA, has made coordination there extremely difficult. At the same time, relying on coordination in Kiev created distance from the reality of the operation.

This context was very difficult to operate and it made it necessary to define clear roles and responsibilities in the humanitarian response, as few organisations are coordinating activities, negotiating priorities and terms and conditions on behalf of the entire humanitarian community.

Additionally, the Ukrainian crisis is competing globally on scarce resources and there are concerns that the crisis will freeze pending solutions of other geopolitical issues. This affects the strategy for the humanitarian response onwards and the role of the Logistics Cluster which, at present, has not yet outlined a phase-out plan.

4. FINDINGS

The Logistics Cluster operation in Ukraine was highly commended in terms of overall response.

With regard to relevance and appropriateness, survey respondents and stakeholders interviewed found the Logistics Cluster operation appropriate (see Annex 3 for an overview of survey results).¹³ Nevertheless, some issues affected the operation effectiveness and efficiency; these are described here following including an analysis of their influence under each Logistics Cluster functional area.

Firstly, the two key themes which were repeatedly mentioned in the interviews with key stakeholders as affecting the performance of the Logistics Cluster, namely the overall humanitarian coordination and limited WFP presence in country, are briefly described here below.

Humanitarian Coordination and Leadership

As referred to in Chapter 3, the Ukrainian context exacerbated the need for strong humanitarian coordination and leadership. Successful coordination with the authorities on both sides of the conflict line has been dependent on the relationships built, which took time to establish and maintain. In terms of negotiating with the authorities, it was most effective to limit the number of actors, and to ensure hierarchy and seniority were respected in negotiations. For operations in the NGCA, it has been necessary to keep a low profile. These factors made it crucial to define clear roles and responsibilities in the humanitarian response, as few organisations were coordinating activities and negotiating terms and conditions on behalf of the entire humanitarian community. However, this was a difficult task– in particular in a setting where most actors were faced with hindered access to beneficiaries, adding to the burden to be able to swiftly carry out relief efforts and reach a large number of people in need. It was repeatedly mentioned in interviews that the overall humanitarian architecture could be strengthened, with roles and responsibilities better defined, and that inclusion in pre-negotiations discussions was crucial for all relevant organisations to negotiate specific agreements with the authorities.

The Logistics Cluster provided technical advice required for addressing or alleviating logistics bottlenecks for the humanitarian response, but the Logistics Cluster was at times not strongly enough positioned in the humanitarian system to ensure that these issues were included in negotiations. Stronger leadership would have been required to advocate for the cluster position and the importance of addressing logistics bottlenecks. This could have been achieved with stronger support from WFP (the senior management of the WFP Country Office was appointed well into the response) or in the form of more experienced Logistics Cluster Coordinators.

Logistics Cluster activation in countries with limited WFP presence

¹³ 100 percent of the survey respondents found the response appropriate.

Another topic frequently mentioned in interviews was the activation of the Logistics Cluster in a country where the lead agency – WFP – had limited presence and no logistics setup. The cluster approach has been designed to increase predictability, accountability, and partnership in emergency responses, which includes having a predetermined and designated lead agency. However, the Logistics Cluster goal is to support humanitarian responses, building on in-country available resources, networks and capacities. Therefore, if agencies other than WFP have more relevant and available local resources they should be able to take the lead in the response or in specific aspects of the response.

The fact that WFP was not operating in Ukraine nor was accredited as an agency prior to the response or even long into the response poses the question of whether the response was in fact built on the strongest and fastest Logistics Cluster participants setup, or if other organisations could have taken on part of the response achieving better results. The Logistics Cluster operation was delayed in reason of the lack of a WFP base in Ukraine – there was no WFP logistics footprint to build or piggy back on, and there was no regular WFP Logistics Officer in country until August 2015. In addition, there was also limited or no support in terms of administration, finance, and HR from WFP Country Office, in the initial months of the response.

Contracting of logistics services could only be done by WFP Regional Bureau in Cairo with the assistance of the Logistics Cluster staff in Ukraine. The Logistics Cluster staff were not trained in WFP contracting rules and regulations, and their contract terms did not allowed them to sign for operational cash advances, contracting of services, and releases in WFP financial system. Despite the efforts of all involved, these issues put additional pressure on staff deployed on the ground and delayed the establishment of functioning common services.

Nonetheless, no other humanitarian organisation offered to take on the lead of the response (or part of it), and organisations were not actively engaging with the Logistics Cluster. However, these strategic decisions can rarely be made in the midst of an emergency response, as they require planning and specific agreements (see Chapter 5 - *Recommendations* for details).

Here following, the Logistics Cluster performance in its core functions is reviewed in terms of relevance, appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency.

4.1. COORDINATION

The Logistics Cluster coordination role in Ukraine was aimed at enhancing predictability, timeliness and efficiency of the response and support through advocacy to overcome logistics bottlenecks in order to access affected people in the conflict zone. Key activities were hosting regular Logistics Cluster coordination meetings and liaise with other clusters and key national and international actors. For coordination, one Key Performance Indicator (KPI) was established related to the number of Logistics Cluster meetings:

Coordination KPI: *The Logistics Cluster will host a minimum of two coordination meetings per month for the first 90 days and a minimum of one coordination meeting for the remaining three months, based on needs;*


While the KPI relates to the coordination meeting, the key focus of the coordination effort was on increasing access and defining simplified procedures for humanitarian actors transporting and delivering relief items to the NGCA. This included working with Ukrainian authorities, other humanitarian coordination actors, and with Logistics Cluster participants on process and documentation as well as organising and coordinating convoy movements for relief items. Table 4 shows key coordination outputs identified during the LLE:

Table 4 - Key Coordination Outputs

Function	Description	Outputs: February – December 2015
Coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Logistics Cluster Coordination meetings - Advocacy - Liaison with key coordination stakeholders (OCHA, HCT, other clusters, Government authorities) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Facilitation of 32 coordination meetings in Kiev and Donetsk from February 2015 to December 2015 - Contribution to establishment of simplified procedures - Participation in inter-cluster meetings on a weekly basis

The level of participation in the Logistics Cluster meetings in Kiev ranged from 5 to 16 organisations with the highest number of participants registered in early July 2015 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 - Number of organisations participating in Logistics Cluster meetings in Kiev



Overall, coordination was perceived by stakeholders and respondents to be relevant and appropriate, and highly appreciated by participating organisations as well as other coordinating actors.

The Logistics Cluster was seen as very effectively contributing to simplified procedures and facilitating relationship building with the Ukrainian authorities. This was due to highly qualified staff with the required technical knowledge and experience needed to contribute to the process. In addition, the national staff through their expertise,

competence, understanding of local practices and consistency contributed significantly to the relationship building process and competently explained local procedures to the humanitarian actors.

For coordination with the NGCA de facto authorities, OCHA was the main negotiator on behalf of the humanitarian community to limit number of agencies the NGCA had to deal with.

In terms of overall effectiveness of the coordination, a few humanitarian organisations felt that the value of the Logistics Cluster coordination was limited due to the late activation and limited engagement of national authorities outside of the Kiev.

Furthermore, it was noted that logistics issues, including access, were not always sufficiently understood and adequately included in the coordination and negotiation with the NGCA de facto authorities. For the latter, the key reason was that logistics issues were either not raised or advocated strongly enough in the humanitarian coordination forums to be well included in negotiation strategies. This was either because the Logistics Cluster (and other clusters) were not present when decisions were taken or because they were not consulted prior to negotiations with NGCA de facto authorities.

The role and responsibilities of the clusters in Ukraine were repeatedly referred to as unclear. For the Logistics Cluster, this for example materialised in connection with the crucial access negotiations with the NGCA, where the Logistics Cluster and other key humanitarian actors were not consulted by the humanitarian coordination lead prior to discussions with authorities. This resulted among others in an agreement made on behalf of the humanitarian community on procedures, which were practically impossible for the humanitarian community to implement. The Logistics Cluster is the technical expert on logistics access and a stronger presence or clear position in the negotiation with the NGCA was requested by stakeholders interviewed to make stronger wins on the access issue. This also includes understanding the role of the Logistics Cluster *vis-a-vis* civil/military coordination, which is key for humanitarian organisations to gain access and deliver assistance and relief items.

Finally, the late activation of the Logistics Cluster, a delayed cluster operation, and the very high turn-over of staff in the Logistics Cluster Coordinator position negatively impacted the effectiveness of the Logistics Cluster coordination function.

While the overall coordination in Kiev was appreciated, additional coordination outside of Kiev was deemed necessary by a number of stakeholders. Decentralised coordination can be fostered by having more Logistics Cluster staff and/or by arranging coordination meetings in the field locations such as Severodonetsk or Kramatorsk. Many operational staff including logistics are not present in Kiev but closer to the NGCA on the Ukrainian side, with operational centres in the towns mentioned above.

4.2. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (IM)

The objective of the Logistics Cluster information management was to support operational decision-making and improve the predictability, timeliness and efficiency of the response by sharing timely and relevant logistics

information among all organisations conducting operations. Key activities were establishment of an IM structure in Kiev, to prepare and disseminate relevant IM products, and the creation of a dedicated webpage.

Information Management KPI: The Logistics Cluster will create one dedicated webpage, and will update this with a minimum of 2 IM products per week for the first month, and a minimum of one IM product per week for the subsequent 5 months

Table 5 lists key outputs produced by the IM unit until the end of December 2015.

Table 5 - Key IM outputs

Function	Description	Outputs: February – December 2015
Information Management	Sharing of information through Logistics Cluster meetings, through a dedicated mailing list and through the Logistics Cluster website. IM products include maps, minutes, procedures, snapshots, and situation updates.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 62 IM products published: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o 29 minutes, o 10 maps, o 9 situation updates, o 1 Operation overview o 6 snapshots, o 6 guidance, forms, SOPs o 1 ConOPS • Mailing list established with 166 recipients • Skype group established where participants exchange information • LCA recently updated and available on website

The IM was found to be relevant, appropriate and effective – both in the survey and in the face-to-face interviews, it was the one activity of the Logistics Cluster which was commended without reservations. 14

The stakeholders appreciated the IM and its contribution mainly because it provided sufficient, relevant and updated information through various IM tools. First of all, the stakeholders interviewed and respondents in the survey felt informed, updated and that they could always approach the Logistics Cluster staff for additional information or bilateral discussion of any issue. In this sense, the IM contributed to a more efficient overall response through sharing relevant and timely information.

The IM unit used a dedicated webpage on the Logistics Cluster website to provide additional and regular updates including minutes of meetings, customs procedures, information on common logistics services and how to access them. From the beginning of the operation on 17 February 2015 until the end of December 2015, the Ukraine page

14 In the December online survey all respondents either agreed or strongly agreed to the statement “To what extent do you agree that Logistics Cluster website is accessible, user-friendly and useful?” Furthermore, when rating IM products all respondents either rated them excellent, very good or good.

registered 4,286 views and 3,039 unique views. This is a significant number of visits compared to similar emergencies and given the limited number of actors operating in country. The first document was available on 20 February 2015 a few days before the activation of the Logistics Cluster.

A dedicated Ukraine mailing list was created and all interested parties could sign up through the website or by contacting the IM focal point. 166 people signed up for the mailing list including representatives of NGOs, INGOs, UN agencies and donors.

A Skype group was also established and many organisations remarked that it was a very useful and quick way to share information, as well as ask questions to the Logistics Cluster and other participants.

A large part of the IM was dedicated to obtaining and sharing up-to-date information about procedures for moving cargo from the Ukrainian GCA to the NGCA. Many commended the Logistics Cluster staff in this regard, as always being extremely helpful and providing relevant information to assist organisations with registration and documentation procedures.

A Logistics Capacity Assessment (LCA) was made available for Ukraine and updated in December 2015.

Overall, in a setting like Ukraine, with “newcomers” starting operations, where the operational conditions change suddenly, and with complicated national regulations (changing even throughout the period of the review), consistent and regular information sharing was particularly useful to ensure an effective and efficient humanitarian response. Dedicated and skilled IM staff and a range of appropriate products were key in ensuring extraordinary support to the response.

4.3. LOGISTICS CLUSTER COORDINATED SERVICES

The two remaining objectives of the Logistics Cluster operation in Ukraine were related to facilitation of access to common transport, storage and convoy services as required with the overall objective of addressing key logistics constraints in accessing the affected population and allowing a safer and coordinated access.

Specific activities were:

- facilitation of humanitarian convoys to reach the affected population in the NGCA;
- temporary storage and staging areas for handling and consolidation of convoy cargo;
- cargo tracking through the Relief Item Tracking Application (RITA);
- transport facilitation (as a last resort to facilitate humanitarian convoys if required).

Three KPIs were developed for Service provision:

- *The Logistics Cluster will address a minimum of 75% of the total number of Service Requests (to be determined based on “Accepted” Service Request Forms in the RITA system) made by the humanitarian community for logistics services (Applicable only to Transport and/or Storage requests made by registered humanitarian organizations for services identified and endorsed by Logistics Cluster participants via a published Logistics Cluster Concept of Operations);*

- *Number of storage facilities supplied to facilitate the consolidation and temporary storage of relief items for WFP and the international community. Target: 3; and*
- *Number of trucks leased for transporting supplies for the humanitarian community: Target: 10.*

Initially, convoy facilitation was not required and transport was done through commercial providers.

Temporary storage was provided in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk organisation of was in process during the mission). Table 6 and 7 below outline key outputs of transport and storage activities.

The services were perceived by the majority of interviewed organisations to be highly relevant, effective and efficient, while a smaller number of organisations deemed them to have started too late to make a real difference for their operation.

The key reasons for why it was relevant for most partners was twofold:

Lack of own logistics setup in country and,

Need for an established relationship with authorities to be effective and efficient in delivering the relief materials to the NGCA.

Most of the organisations interviewed did not have the capacity to take on the cargo delivery role. Understanding the procedures for registration, keeping abreast of changes, establishing relationships with authorities and completing the deliveries within the designated and limited timeslots for crossing the contact line, would have required a substantial investment in staff (operational and liaison staff).

In relation to intermediate storage, it was difficult for most organisations to rent storage facilities in the NGCA due to the lack of the registration necessary to operate in those areas and to non-functioning regular financial transactions in the NGCA requiring large cash payments to unregistered companies or alternative modes of payments.

In light of these challenges, most organisations found in common services an effective delivery option, which contributed to the overall humanitarian response optimising time and maximising cost-efficiencies.

Nonetheless, a small number of organisations, the more established ones with large operations, did not find common services particularly useful especially in the initial phases of the response. The main reasons behind the negative opinion was that these organisations started their operations before the Logistics Cluster was activated and therefore they already had established logistics setups, hence, going through the Logistics Cluster would have added an additional procedural layer, which would have delayed operations.

Transport and Convoy facilitation

In relation to transport facilitation, this service included support with documents and transport from Dnipropetrovsk to the NGCA – Donetsk and Luhansk. From June 2015, transport to these destinations was carried out with convoys – directed by a convoy leader, also facilitating movements across the contact line.

When the Logistics Cluster was activated on 23 February 2015, the need for transport facilitation and possible convoy movements into NGCA was identified as the key gap for the Logistics Cluster to address. Regular transport was facilitated from the beginning of April to mid-June and the first convoy, consisting of two trucks, left on 25 June 2015.

Three additional convoys were subsequently dispatched until the end of August when the NGCA authorities suspended humanitarian operations in the area, including movement of relief items. The four convoys had moved 23 trucks across the contact line.

Once the NGCA authorities allowed some humanitarian organisations to operate in the NGCA, the Logistics Cluster operation resumed convoy facilitation and a new convoy was dispatched on 30 October 2015. From this date until the end of the year, the Logistics Cluster managed to streamline the convoy movement and was able to dispatch nine convoys for a total of 146 trucks on behalf of 24 organisations.

Table 6 - Key convoy transport results

Function	Description	Outputs: February – December 2015
Convoys and road transport	Road transport and later convoys from Dnipropetrovsk to NGCA including temporary storage, handling, and facilitation of crossing contact line delivery to Donetsk/Luhansk.	4,823 m ³ of relief items transported 13 convoys facilitated (169 trucks/2,862 mt) 24 organisations used the transport or convoy services – either as consignors or consignees 85 requests received, hereof 11 cancelled and 74 completed Top 5 users as per mt sent were (consignors): UNHCR, 73%, PIN, 11%, DRC, 7%, FAO, 4%, and UNICEF, 3% (details in Annex 6)

Overall, in terms of common storage, a clear need was identified throughout the period under analysis. The support to the PU-AMI common storage was appreciated, but access to safe storage for all humanitarian actors was not facilitated through the Logistics Cluster, despite several announcements. Additionally, the field hubs reached a limited number of organisations, and WFP was a key user.

Storage/Staging facilities

In addition to the storage facility in Dnipropetrovsk, used as transshipment hub for the convoys going into NGCA, the Logistics Cluster secured a warehouse in Donetsk in March 2015. However, the location of the warehouse was too close to the actual fighting and the warehouse was damaged during artillery fire. Several other options were explored, but it proved difficult to find additional storage as most suitable facilities were in close proximity of military

presence, or the contact line. Only recently did the Logistics Cluster secure a new warehouse in Donetsk. The new warehouse in Donetsk has mainly been used as transit hub for cargo en route to Luhansk as most agencies did not have the authorisation to operate in Donetsk from July 2015. At the time of the mission, the Logistics Cluster was looking to secure a warehouse in Luhansk to respond to the request of NGOs; however, very few organisations were at the time allowed to operate in the area, due to issues of accreditation.

Table 1 - Key storage results

Function	Description	Outputs: February – December 2015
Storage	<p>Dnipropetrovsk (10,000 m²)</p> <p>Donetsk (2,000 m²)</p>	<p>Storage facilities made available to organisations from 12 March 2015, in two strategic locations</p> <p>18 agencies used the facilities – storing 7,983 m³/3,909 mt in the two facilities.</p> <p>Dnipropetrovsk (5,119 m³/2,507 mt)</p> <p>Top 5 users as per mt stored: UNHCR, 72%, Caritas, 10%, All-Ukrainian Union of Associations of Evangelical Christian Baptists, 5%, UNICEF, 5%, PIN, 5% (details in Annex 6)</p> <p>Donetsk (2,864 m³/1,402 mt)</p> <p>Top 5 users as per mt stored (five users only): PIN, 81%, DRC, 11%, UNHCR, 7%, International HIV/AIDS Alliance, 1%, WHO, 1% (details in Annex 6)</p>

Tracking of services

As per standard procedure in Logistics Cluster operations with common services, a Relief Items Tracking Application (RITA) has been rolled out for the Ukraine emergency response.

With very limited number of pick-up and delivery points, tracking of items in this operation has been comparatively simple. None of the organisations interviewed raised concerns or had complaints on RITA.¹⁵



¹⁵ RITA was rolled out in beginning of April 2015. Trainings for national operators was done from 1-3 June 2015. From April to December 2015, the Logistics Cluster received 85 Service Request Forms (SRFs), whereof 74 were executed and 11 cancelled.

OPERATION MANAGEMENT

Issues were raised in terms of feasibility of management of the operation given the WFP office was not operational when the Cluster operation started, with no Logistics staff. The WFP Head of Logistics was designated as funds manager, and the implementation of services was meant to be supported by the WFP Logistics Staff. Initially, these functions fell instead under the responsibility of the Logistics Cluster Coordinators (see next section for more details).

4.4. GLOBAL LOGISTIC CLUSTER

The Global Logistics Cluster supports field operations with strategy, policy guidance, mobilisation of resources within the cluster network and provision of surge capacity.¹⁶ This is in addition to supporting field operations with systems and partnership linkages, which can help facilitate the field operation obligations.

The GLC mainly supported with the assessment mission, activation, recruitment of international staff and also national staff, as the limited capacity in WFP Country Office did not allow for local recruitments. The GLC support was limited (at times there was no backstop in Rome) and according to the interview results more assistance was needed, in particular given the limited operational and administrative support available in WFP Country Office.

The key reasons for the limited GLC support were not a consequence of deficient systems or policies, but a significant overstretch of resources, due to multiple L3 emergencies and staff rotation, due to short-term contract. The GLC was not equipped in terms of staff and resource to handle a large number of large scale emergencies at the same time. This was noted already by an external evaluation of the GLC conducted in 2012, which stated that the GLC would not be able to respond to additional emergencies given the existing resources.¹⁷ Since then, the number and scale of emergencies have increased and in 2015, the GLC supported 13 emergencies. The assistance provided to the operation in Ukraine testifies to the dedication and competences of the staff in the GLC, and to the reliable support from Standby Partners.

Staff strategy

Lack of continuity of Logistics Cluster Coordinators was mentioned by the majority of interviewed stakeholders – external and internal Logistics Cluster staff.

Turnover is particularly detrimental in a response that relies heavily on the relationships with authorities, UN agencies and civil society, and on the deep understanding of the operating context.

From the start of the operation in February until the end of December 2015, five staff members have been acting as Logistics Cluster Coordinators, making two months the average deployment time for Cluster Coordinators. The high turnover was due to strained human resources ensuing multiple L3 emergencies (though not as difficult as other more hard-ship duty stations) as well as non-attractive contract conditions and limited career potential resulting from the position of Logistics Cluster Coordinator. Taking into consideration that it is during emergency operations

¹⁶ Logistics Cluster Global Strategy 2013-2015, Rome, January 2013

¹⁷ Joint Evaluation of the Global Logistics Cluster, August 2012

that the likelihood and impact of a reputational risk for the Logistic Cluster/WFP is at the highest, this issue needs to be addressed by WFP, as cluster lead, as a priority.

On the other hand national staff have been highly commended by Logistics Cluster participants and colleagues. Their professionalism and quick understanding of Logistics Cluster and ability to progressively take on additional responsibility was highly appreciated, especially given the lack of previous cluster/emergency experience.

In July, the Logistics Cluster Coordinator organised a workshop for its staff entailing a number of specific sessions on planning for the operation, but also general sessions on the overall humanitarian architecture and the role of the Logistics Cluster. While this might be difficult to replicate in a full scale sudden onset emergency, most participants praised the initiative and stated that it improved their contribution to the Logistics Cluster operation as a whole.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings from the survey and the interviews as outlined in Chapter 4, a number of recommendations are summarised here below as well as in the recommendation matrix in Chapter 6.

5.1. COORDINATION

While the Logistics Cluster response was overall commended for its coordination role mainly due to competent staff with great technical skills, the coordination could have been more effective in terms of leadership, clear roles and responsibilities, and a faster activation and set-up.

In a context like Ukraine where coordination is so essential in gaining more effective access to the affected population, it is recommended to strengthen the leadership and resources of the Logistics Cluster in particular at the beginning of the response. Usually WFP, as lead agency, provides support through its senior management raising challenges and constraints concerning the response in high level coordination meetings. Alternatively, a strong Logistics Cluster Coordinator takes on the role.

In cases where there is no or limited WFP logistics capacity on the ground, it is recommended to deploy a strong Logistics Cluster Coordinator to ensure leadership and the inclusion of logistics issues at the highest level in humanitarian fora.

It is further recommended to deploy a solid logistics support team alongside the Cluster Coordinator to handle contractual obligations and administrative issues ensuring a prompt response kick-off.

Finally when feasible, it is recommended to consider transferring the leadership temporarily to another agency.

The definition of roles and responsibilities in emergency coordination also entails clarifying the role of the Logistics Cluster versus the role of OCHA in specific activities requiring civil-military coordination, such as access negotiation and convoy movements (in particular technical aspects and feasibility). It is therefore recommended that roles are clarified at global level between the Logistics Cluster and OCHA and the modus operandi defined.

On an operational level, it was suggested by several stakeholders to increase field coordination. It is recommended to explore the feasibility of having ad hoc basis coordination meetings in other cities near the contact line.

5.2. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

The IM function in Ukraine was highly appreciated; staff continuity and skills were commended, and the use of new tools, such as the Skype forum, was considered very useful in ensuring quick information sharing among the participating organisations, and viewed as best practice where relevant IM tools were used optimally.

The Skype forum worked well and seems to have increased the engagement of the participants. Participants could share real-time information, raise questions and discuss issues relevant to the Logistics Cluster. The GLC IM Unit is recommended to look further into the development of this “solution” and to foster replication future operations. Skype could also be used to create group fora dedicated to IM Officers or Cluster Coordinators to increase knowledge sharing among the Logistics Cluster staff across operations.

5.3. COMMON LOGISTICS SERVICES FACILITATION

The establishment of common logistics services was delayed due to WFP limited capacity on the ground and limited or slow deployment of logistics operational staff as well as support staff. When services were finally functional, they were highly valued by the organisations interviewed which testifies to the effectiveness and efficiency of common logistics services in emergencies.

However, the delay was critical and the Logistics Cluster needs to develop contingency planning for operations in countries where there is limited or no WFP capacity to provide common services as provider of last resort as mandated by the IASC.

The lack of an accredited Country Office delayed staff recruitment and supporting functions, and operations started with senior staff rotating in and out of the country. In a similar setting, it is recommended to establish a trigger mechanism for deploying full-scale support from the onset on a “no regrets” basis, which can later be scaled down. This could be integrated in the needs assessment done by the first team on the ground by strengthening the assessment of the support required for setting up the operation (which usually relies on the existing WFP set-up in country), and an appraisal on the capacity and interest of other agencies to support the scaling up of the operation.

In 2015, the Logistics Cluster engaged in two operations with limited WFP presence – Vanuatu and Ukraine. A comparative study of the two can be carried out to identify unique and common constraints and ideas to move forward.

5.4. GLOBAL LOGISTIC CLUSTER

There are four recommendations related to the assistance provided by the Global Logistics Cluster support team.

First of all, it is recommended to review and align staff and resources in accordance with the number of emergencies supported. Failing this revision, the risk of providing inadequate support is high with significant consequences in terms of the effectiveness, efficiency and appropriateness, even relevance, of the Logistics Cluster responses.

For emergencies like Ukraine, where the presence of the lead agency in country is limited, available and reliable assistance from the support team is particularly critical. It is therefore recommended to clearly define the support which the team can provide to an operation, to ensure it is available upon request and to raise awareness among participating organisations on what kind of assistance can be sought.

The Global Logistics Cluster Support Team is recommended to assist in identifying operational requirements during the activation assessment, in consultation with WFP Country Office or, as in the case of Ukraine, with the lead agency Regional Bureau responsible for the country in emergency. Also the Support Team is recommended to review options for closer cooperation with other agencies with in-country logistic capacities and to raise awareness on the Logistics Cluster in WFP Regional Bureaux and clarify roles and responsibilities between the cluster and the Country Offices in operations. Enhanced communication and consultation is recommended to strengthen the support at all levels.

Second, committed and competent Logistics Cluster staff and secondees were the main success factor in the operation. However, high turnover of international staff due to unavailability or willingness to deploy, both in WFP and in other organisations impacted on the continuity and thereby the effectiveness of the response. It is therefore recommended to review the recruitment and retention strategy for the Logistics Cluster to ensure qualified staff are available for longer deployments. At the same time, there is a need to discuss surge capacity and secondment frameworks including the use of secondments in sensible positions in operations.

In terms of staff training, a Logistics Cluster staff training programme could be developed in cooperation with a university or higher education training institution with a view to further qualifying the cluster resource and increase Logistics Cluster professionalism hence attractiveness to WFP and other humanitarian organisations. For settings like Ukraine, knowledge of WFP structure and procedures is essential to enable decentralised decision-making (for example on contracting of logistics service providers) and it is recommended to include this skillset in trainings. The Logistics Cluster Strategy 2016-2018 includes staff development and training as a one of the goals.

Third, both coordination and common services facilitation would have benefitted from stronger leadership and faster scale up of the operation. To be prepared to a similar situation in the future where limited WFP and humanitarian response capacity are available in the country, it is recommended to design strategies and implementation options for activation of the Logistics Cluster that include systems to enable fast scale up of the WFP response, if no other organisation is available to take the lead.

Finally, it is recommended to further document the performance of the Logistics Cluster operations and the contribution to the overall humanitarian response by applying project management monitoring tools. A few essential KPIs can be developed by the Logistics Cluster participants and discussed in coordination forums with indications on how they are seen to contribute to the overall response. This will help the coordination by directing resources

towards strategic areas, and by ensuring accountability towards the humanitarian community. Rigorous performance monitoring can also help with fundraising for critical activities and in operation decision-making to understand what gaps are addressed, what services are the most critical and what the criteria are in moving forward, (phase out, exit strategy).

6. MATRIX - OVERVIEW OF KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS	
I	Strengthen the Leadership and staff and response capacity of the Logistics Cluster
II	Clarify roles and responsibilities of the Logistics Cluster
III	Develop strategy including contingency planning for delivery of common services
IV	Review the recruitment and retention strategy
LOGISTICS CLUSTER FUNCTIONS	
1. COORDINATION	
1.1	STRATEGY: Strengthen the Leadership of the Logistics Cluster to enhance logistics aspects in
1.2	GUIDANCE: Clarify roles and responsibilities of the Logistics Cluster <i>vis-à-vis</i> other coordinating
1.3	OPERATIONAL – Assess the feasibility and need for enhancing local coordination
2. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT	
2.1	PROJECT SUPPORT: Promote the use of the IM tool portfolio as successfully done in Ukraine
2.2	COMMUNICATION: Develop a solution (possibly Skype) for instant news update, experience sharing and problem solving
3. LOGISTICS SERVICE FACILITATION	
3.1	PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY: Develop common service Contingency Plan for countries with
4. GLOBAL LOGISTICS CLUSTER SUPPORT	
4.1	STRATEGY AND FUNDING: Review and align Logistics Cluster staff and resources with the
4.2	HUMAN RESOURCE STRATEGY: Review the recruitment and retention strategy to ensure
4.3	STRATEGY: Design strategies and implementation options for countries with limited or no lead agency presence/capacity

ANNEX 1 - PEOPLE CONSULTED

Organisation	Role	Name and position	Date and location of interview
ACF	Participant to the Logistics Cluster	Volodymyr Moiseinko, Logistics Manager	December 16, 2015, Skype
CARITAS	Participant to the Logistics Cluster	Maryna Vorzheva, Procurement and Logistics Manager	December 10, 2015, Kiev
DRC	Participant to the Logistics Cluster	Viorel Velea, Procurement and Logistics Adviser	December 17, 2015, Skype
DRC Standby Partner to Logistics Cluster	Logistics Cluster	Matthew Serventy, Logistics Cluster Coordinator	December 18, 2015, Skype
ECHO	Donor	Srdan Stojanovic, Rapid Response Coordinator for Eastern Neighbourhood, Central Asia, Iraq and Iran	December 9, 2015, Kiev
ICRC	Participant to the Logistics Cluster	Patrick Montaner, Logistics Coordinator	December 9, 2015, Kiev
IOM	Participant to the Logistics Cluster	Ester Ruiz de Azua, Coordinator	December 18, 2015, Skype
Mercy Corps	Participant to the Logistics Cluster	Stuart Willcuts, Country Director	December 9, 2015, Kiev
MSB Standby Partner to the Logistics Cluster	Logistics Cluster Dnipropetrovsk	Zaur Maharramov, Dnipropetrovsk Hub Manager	December 18, 2015, Skype
MSB Standby Partner to the Logistics Cluster	Logistics Cluster Donetsk	Cameron Kiss, Donetsk	December 7, 2015, Donetsk
MSF OCB	Participant to the Logistics Cluster	Vitaliy Pak, Supply and Logistics Coordinator	December 10, 2015, Kiev
NGO Forum Ukraine	Coordination	Fredric Larsson, Senior Coordinator	December 18, 2015, Skype
NRC	Participant to the Logistics Cluster	Robert Reece, Logistics	December 15, 2015, Skype
OCHA	Coordination	Oleksandr Ovdienko, Humanitarian Advisor	December 4, 2015, Kiev
OCHA	Coordination	Ivane Bochorishvili, Humanitarian Affairs Officer	December 4, 2015, Kiev
OCHA	Coordination	Nadir Minbashiyev, Deputy Head of Office, Donetsk Area	December 7, 2015, Donetsk
PIN	Participant to the Logistics Cluster	Katerina Sviridenko, Administrator, Relief and Development	December 7, 2015, Donetsk
PIN	Participant to the Logistics Cluster	Lenka Blahova, Procurement and Logistics	December 15, 2015, Skype
UNHCR	Participant to the Logistics Cluster	Erol Arduc, Head of Field Office, Donetsk	December 7, 2015, Donetsk
UNHCR	Participant to the Logistics Cluster	Vadym Berest, Supply Associate	December 10, 2015, Donetsk
UNICEF	Participant to the Logistics Cluster	Natascha Stojkovska, Emergency Coordinator	December 4, 2015, Kiev
UNICEF	Participant to the Logistics Cluster	Willian Fellows, WASH Cluster Coordinator	December 4, 2015, Kiev
WFP	WFP Ukraine	Giancarlo Stopponi, Head of Office and Programme	December 4, 2015, Kiev
WFP	WFP Logistics Ukraine	Aida Filipovic, Head of Logistics	December 4, 2015, Kiev

WFP	Logistics Cluster	Patrick Baudry, Logistics Cluster Coordinator	Consulted several times while in Kiev
WFP	WFP Ukraine	Anna Vinnichenko, Head of WFP Sub Office of Luhansk	December 7, 2015, Donetsk
WFP	WFP Regional Bureau, Cairo	Carlos Melendez, Senior Regional Logistics Officer	December 15, 2015, Skype
WFP	Logistics Cluster	Andrii Shapkin, Logistics Officer	December 7, 2015, Donetsk
WFP	Global Logistics Cluster and Logistics Cluster in Ukraine	Andre Hermann, Desk Officer for Ukraine and Inter-rim Logistics Coordinator, Ukraine	December 15, 2015, Skype
WFP	Logistics Cluster Ukraine	Kennet Blixt, Logistics Cluster Coordinator	December 15, 2015, Skype
WFP	Logistics Cluster	Nenad Grkovic, Logistics Cluster Coordinator	December 16, 2015, Skype
WFP	Global Logistics Cluster	John Myraunet, Global Logistics Cluster Deputy	December 17, 2015, Skype
WFP	Global Logistics Cluster/Logistics Cluster Ukraine	Mark Warne-Smith, Civ-Mil Liaison Officer	December 16, 2015, Skype
WHO	Participant to the Logistics Cluster	Dr. Oleg Storozhenko, Emergency Medical Coordinator, Donetsk/Luhansk	December 7, 2015, Donetsk

ANNEX 2 – DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

EVALUATION DOCUMENTS

OECD-DAC, OECD-DAC evaluation criteria (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committee <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/2754804.pdf>)

ALNAP, Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria, An ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies <http://www.alnap.org/resource/5253.aspx>

GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE DOCUMENTS

Temporary Order on Control of the Movement of People, Transport Vehicles and Cargo Along the Contact Line in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions – English version, unofficial translation, Ukraine State Fiscal Services, September 2015

IASC

IASC, Reference Module for Inter-agency Cluster Coordination at Country Level, revised July 2015

LOGISTICS CLUSTER STRATEGY DOCUMENTS – available at www.logcluster.org

Logistics Cluster Global Strategy 2013-2015, Rome, January 2013

Joint Evaluation of the Global Logistics Cluster, prepared by the KonTerra Group, August 2012 – supported by WFP, UNICEF and the Government of Netherlands

Logistics Cluster Global Strategy 2016-2018, Draft, Rome, February 2016

LOGISTICS CLUSTER UKRAINE DOCUMENTS – available at www.logcluster.org/ukraine

Logistics Cluster, Concept of Operation, Ukraine, 20 February 2015

Logistics Cluster, Standard Operating Procedures, Ukraine, 5 March 2015

Logistics Cluster, 3 Guidance on SRF and Transport April and August 2015

Logistics Cluster, 2 Forms August and November 2015

Logistics Cluster, 6 Snapshot from April to August 2015

Logistics Cluster, 29 Meeting minutes from Kiev and Donetsk

Logistics Cluster, 9 Situation Updates from 27 February to end of December 2015

Logistics Cluster, 10 Maps from 20 February to end of December 2015

Logistics Cluster, 1 Operations Overview 2 July 2015

Logistics Cluster, Survey December 2015

OCHA AND UN UKRAINE DOCUMENTS

Humanitarian Country Team Ukraine, Contingency Plan, May 2015, UN

Humanitarian Bulletin Ukraine, Issue 05, 01-31 December 2015, OCHA

Humanitarian Bulletin Ukraine, Issue 06, 12 February 2016, OCHA

Humanitarian Dash Board January-November 2015, OCHA,
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/dashboard_november_20151218.pdf.

Preliminary Response Plan, August 15, 20140 covering August-December 2014 (only UN), OCHA

OCHA 3W, February 2015 onwards:

https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/3w_overview_partners_20151231_v3.pdf

Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2015, published December 2014, OCHA

Ukraine, HRP 2015 Achievements, OCHA

Ukraine Humanitarian Response Plan 2015 (revised), OCHA

<http://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-2015-humanitarian-response-plan-revised-enuk>

Ukraine Situation Report No.22, 26 December 2014, OCHA

Ukraine Situation Reports 2015 onwards, OCHA

WFP INTERNAL DOCUMENTS

WFP, Special Operation 200281, Narrative and budget including budget revisions

WFP, WFP Management Response to the Recommendations of the Summary Evaluation Report, Global Logistics Cluster, Report for Consideration for WFP Executive Board, Second Regular Session, 12-14 November 2012

ANNEX 3 – OVERVIEW OF SURVEY RESULTS

<http://www.logcluster.org/document/ukraine-lle-annex-3-overview-survey-results>

ANNEX 4 – MISSION TERMS OF REFERENCE

Logistics Cluster Lessons Learned Exercise – Ukraine

Terms of Reference

Date:	3 December to 11 December
Location:	Ukraine
Team Members:	Dorte Friis, Logistics Officer, GLC Rome Jeppe Andersen, Logistics Officer, GLC Rome Tom Olson, Emergency Supply Officer, UNICEF, Copenhagen
QA:	Olexander Babanin, Supply Officer, WHO

Country Situation Background

Since the spring of 2014 Ukraine experienced a rapid increase of people in need of humanitarian assistance due to instability and armed conflict in the eastern parts of the country. In December 2014, the first Humanitarian Clusters were activated, including Education, Emergency Shelter and NFI, Food, Nutrition, Health, Protection and WASH and in February 2015, the Logistics Cluster was also formally activated.

The Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) projected that in Ukraine in 2015 around 5 million people would be in need of humanitarian assistance including 1 million Internally Displaced People (IDPs). The main constraint for humanitarian operations was access, primarily to affected populations in the regions of Luhansk and Donetsk where armed groups, active conflicts and later registration of agencies impeded the deliveries of life saving aid and services.

Country Logistics Cluster Operational Background

The Logistics Clusters main focus, in close coordination with OCHA and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), was to support humanitarian organisations' in accessing the affected population including in the difficult to reach conflict areas. Based on initial assessments, the Logistics Cluster established an operation providing:

- Coordination – to facilitate an unified humanitarian logistics response minimising duplication and targeting support to the identified prioritised logistics gaps and bottlenecks;

- Information Management - to contribute to an efficient and effective response through the promotion and facilitation of sharing of logistics information among all organisations;
- Provision of common services – to support organisations with services which could help them reach the affected population in an effective and efficient manner.

Ukraine LLE Objective

Following the above, the overall objectives of the Lessons Learned exercise for the Logistics Cluster operation in Ukraine are:

1. To assess the performance and the activities undertaken by the Logistics Cluster in Ukraine to support the humanitarian community in reaching the people in need of assistance. The operation is assessed in terms of the degree to which it was relevant/appropriate, efficient, and effective in identifying the gaps and addressing the needs of the humanitarian community.
2. To draw lessons and recommendations from the Ukraine operation to support the Ukraine Logistics Cluster performance in the future, but also to support the development of the Global Logistics Cluster through the identification of best practices across operations. One particular area here is to draw lessons on the activation of the Logistics Cluster in settings where the lead agency, WFP, had limited presence and initial capacity.

Scope of the LLE

To assess the performance of the Logistics Cluster operation and draw lessons and recommendations, the Lessons Learned exercise will focus on the Logistics Cluster's core functions at country level as defined by IASC– the sectoral coordination, the provision of common logistics services and its facilitating role for the humanitarian actors. The period covered will be from activation of the Cluster in February 2015 up till end of December as possible.

Specifically, the LLE will look at:

- 1) The relevance and appropriateness of the Logistics Cluster activation and response – how were local needs and priorities identified, and the subsequent Cluster operation designed and implemented?
- 2) The effectiveness of the Logistics Cluster response – did the Cluster operation meet the stated objectives in a timely fashion?
- 3) The efficiency of the Logistics Cluster response – how efficient were available resources used for the implementation of the Logistics Cluster operation?
- 4) The Logistics Cluster role in negotiating access to conflict areas?

The Logistics Cluster operation in Ukraine cannot be meaningfully analysed without also considering the supporting framework in form of the Global Logistics Cluster and constraining factors (funding and HR).

Further, in support of the current Cluster operation, the LLE will also:

- 5) Collect feedback from stakeholders on future needs to inform the future strategy of the Cluster operation in Ukraine.

Methodology

Data for the Lessons Learned report will be collected through:

- 1) Desk review of key documents prior to the mission in country;
- 2) User survey – feedback from users who have been or are currently present in Ukraine and are participating in the Logistics Cluster;
- 3) Staff surveys - feedback from key Cluster staff through Staff debrief surveys and end of mission reports;
- 4) Quantitative data related to the cluster services;
- 5) Single or group interviews in country with Key Informants (Users of services, Government representatives, Coordinating institutions (Clusters, OCHA, HC, HCT) and others as relevant).

Output

The Lessons Learned Team will produce a report summarising the key findings and recommendations. The final draft will be sent to the WFP CO management, Logistics Cluster Coordinator in Ukraine, and the Global Logistics Cluster for validation and comments. The final report will be shared at a Global level for feedback from global stakeholders and published on the Logistics Cluster website.

ANNEX 6 – OVERVIEW OF USE OF SERVICES

Overview of use of transport and storage until 31 December 2015

Users of transport services (Consignors)	Weight , MT	% of total
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	2,083	72.8%
People in Need	317	11.1%
Danish Refugee Council	195	6.8%
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation	100	3.5%
United Nations Children's Fund	86	3.0%
Caritas	44	1.5%
World Health Organization	21	0.7%
International HIV/AIDS Alliance	11	0.4%
Save the Children's Fund	4	0.1%
All Ukrainian association of Public Health	1	0.0%
TOTAL	2,862	100.0%

Organisation storing items in Dnipropetrovsk	Total (mt)	% of total
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	1,799	71.7%
Caritas	244	9.7%
All-Ukrainian Union of Associations of Evangelical Christian Baptists	134	5.3%
United Nations Children's Fund	130	5.2%
People in Need	118	4.7%
International Organisation for Migration	29	1.2%
Danish Refugee Council	19	0.8%
World Health Organization	16	0.6%
International HIV/AIDS Alliance	11	0.5%
Association Internationale pour la Cooperation Medicale Ukraine	7	0.3%
TOTAL	2,507	100.0%

Organisation storing items in Donetsk	Total (mt)	% of total
People in Need	1,133	80.8%
Danish Refugee Council	158	11.2%
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	95	6.7%
International HIV/AIDS Alliance	11	0.8%
World Health Organization	5	0.4%
TOTAL	1,402	100.0%

ANNEX 7 – ACCRONYMS

ACCRONYM	
ACF	Action Against Hunger
ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
ALNAP	The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
CAR	Central African Republic
CCO	Committee for Inter-NGO Coordination
CERF	United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
ConOPS	Logistics Cluster Concept of Operation
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECHO	European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department
GLC	Global Logistics Cluster
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICCG	Inter-Cluster Coordination Group
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
INGOs	International Non-Government-Organisations
IM	Information Management
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
LLE	Lessons Learned Exercise
Mt	Metric tonnes
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in CAR
MSU	Mobile Storage Unit
NFI	Non-Food-Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee
PU-AMI	Première Urgence Internationale
RITA	Relief Item Tracking System
SitRep	Situation Report
SO	Special Operation
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme